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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE FOLKLORE OF FIRE FORENSICS

On a cold December night in 2013, firefighters at the White Earth
Reservation in north-western Minnesota were pumping water into the charred
remains where a small farmhouse had stood just hours before.1 What was left of
the structure bore little resemblance to the house it once was. The small secondfloor bedroom was destroyed, consumed by flames and collapsed onto the floor
of the living space below. On the first floor, only a couple of badly burned partial
exterior walls to the kitchen and dining room still stood. The rest of the house
had been gutted by fire, either having burned completely or fallen through a hole

I

See K. Mahle, Investigation Report, State Fire Marshal Division, Department of Public

Safety, Case Number 2013-392 (7/14/2014), in the case of United States v. Jones, No. 14-cr-148,
2015 WL 927357 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2015) (report on file with authors).
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that had been burned through the living room floor into the basement. Amongst
the burned debris in the basement was a smoldering couch, reduced to its broken
wooden frame and metal springs. And next to the couch, hidden amongst the
embers still smoldering in the basement, was the body of Shanlonda Clark.
When the fire investigator from the State Fire Marshal's Office arrived
on the scene, the smoke was still rising. The small farmhouse and everything in
it had burned, quite literally, to the ground. Undeterred by the paucity of
evidence, the investigator was confident that he could determine where and how
the fire began. He thought he had key pieces of information that helped to make
order out of the chaos: he already knew where the fire started, he already knew
who started it, and he already knew why. He had the answers to these questions
before he ever stepped foot onto the fire scene. Now all he had to do was prove
it.

The alleged arsonist in this case, like many other defendants in arson
cases, was convicted in large part due to a fire investigator's expert testimony
about the origin and cause of the fire. It was seemingly based on an independent,
objective, and scientific examination and analysis of the physical fire-scene
evidence, conducted through well-developed and accepted standardized
procedures.
In truth, it is common for fire-scene analysis to rely on unmeasured and
untested forensic methodologies masquerading as science. Although some
particularly unreliable and out-of-date techniques have been largely rejected by
modem fire investigators, 2 leading to an improvement in fire investigation
overall, several well entrenched and equally concerning practices remain.
In a perfect world, a forensic examination-whether it is of a fingerprint
or a fire-scene-would be conducted by a neutral, expert observer, examining all
of the relevant evidence, using well calibrated instruments, and confirmed
techniques leading to reliable and accurate conclusions.
Fire investigations are never conducted in such a world. A typical fire
investigation relies upon subjective analyses based on emotionally charged,
irrelevant, and potentially biasing information. Often, the forensic fire scene
examiner tasked with determining the origin and cause of the fire is doing
double-duty, simultaneously leading the criminal arson investigation to establish
a motive and identify a suspect. In many cases, it is difficult to recognize where
the forensic fire investigation stops and the criminal arson investigation begins.
This mix of a subjective analysis, exposure to irrelevant and potentially
biasing information, and an investigator who is both forensic examiner and
criminal detective, combines to form a toxic investigative environment. Under
these circumstances, the forensic discipline of fire origin and cause
determination disintegrates from an objective application of the scientific
method into an entirely faith-based endeavor.

2

See generally John J. Lentini, The Evolution ofFire Investigation and Its Impact on Arson

Cases, 27

CRIM. JUST.

no. 1, Spring 2012, at 12.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 119

In essence, fire investigation is a forensic discipline with no internal
mechanism to limit the conditions under which its core methodologies are
applied, where an unverified statement of a witness can be translated by the fire
investigator into a final conclusion, where expert opinions are often based on a
complete lack of physical evidence, and where the investigator-acting both as
a forensic examiner and a criminal investigator-is routinely called upon to
testify to matters entirely outside his expertise. As a result, conclusions in fire
investigations are primed for error, bias, and exaggeration, potentially leading to
a whole new generation of wrongful arson convictions.
Once convicted, the victims of this form of junk-science have virtually
no path to prove, whether through direct appeals or through collateral review,
that they are innocent. As of this writing, well over 1,800 innocent individuals
have been exonerated, 3 344 by DNA alone; 4 by the time of publication, no doubt
there will be more. This means that there remain countless individuals locked
behind bars for crimes they did not commit. We know this because the DNA
exonerations represent only those cases in which physical evidence was
collected, preserved, located, and usable years or decades after the crimes. Thus,
logic compels us to conclude that there remain other innocent individuals that
are imprisoned whose cases simply lack the physical evidence that might
exonerate them.
And yet, none of the post-conviction remedies within our criminal
justice system-not direct appeals, not habeas review, not actual innocence
claims-are designed to give incarcerated individuals a meaningful path to prove
their innocence in the absence of physical evidence. This is particularly true for
those convicted of arson crimes because by its very nature, arson is a crime in
which often there is little or no clear physical evidence to speak of; the analysis
of the remaining evidence is remarkably subjective; and the misidentification of
an accidental fire as arson is dangerously easy and surprisingly common.5 How,
then, do we correct wrongful arson convictions?
Currently, our criminal justice system distributes the risk of wrongful
convictions in a manner that-after conviction and assuming a measure of due
process-overwhelmingly values finality and comity overjustice and innocence.
The calculus that procedural due process, comity, and finality should prevent us
from aggressively adopting systemic reforms to make it easier for these
3

The

National

Registry

of

Exonerations,

U.

MICH.

L.

SCH.,

http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
4

The Cases,

INNOCENCE PROJECT,

http://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#exonerated-

by-dna (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
5

See generally PAUL

CONVICTION:

BIEBER, ARSON RES. PROJECT, ANATOMY OF A WRONGFUL ARSON
EVENT
ANALYSIS
IN
FIRE
INVESTIGATION,

SENTINEL

http://thearsonproject.org/chanr/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/wrongful-convictions.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2016) (estimating that approximately two-thirds of wrongful arson convictions
resulting in an exoneration involved unreliable forensic methodologies leading to an undetermined
or accidental fire being misidentified as arson).
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wrongfully convicted individuals to use new scientific evidence to prove their
innocence seems both morally repugnant and dangerously atavistic.
The below Article proceeds in four parts: Part I offers a detailed analysis
of the basics of forensic fire investigation. Part II examines the tension between
the forensic discipline of fire investigation, which seeks to determine the origin,
cause, and development of a fire, and the criminal investigation of arson, which
purports to establish who started the fire and why. Part III analyzes the unique
and substantial risks of wrongful convictions posed by arson investigation, and
how those risks are magnified by a criminal judicial system that makes it virtually
impossible for defendants to claim innocence in the absence of biological
evidence-even when their convictions are based on investigative methods
below rudimentary standards of science-because it favors comity and finality
above all else. Part IV proposes a set of systemic scientific reforms designed to
establish rigorous forensic methods and eliminate potential biases during fire
investigations and another set of systemic legislative reforms that provide
procedural and substantive remedies for innocent individuals to challenge their
convictions on the basis of bad science.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SCIENCE OF FIRE INVESTIGATION

To understand just how easy it is to misidentify an accidental fire as
arson, one must simply look to the standards (or lack thereof) imposed upon the
fire investigator, the underlying limitations of the forensic discipline itself, and
the fire investigator's willingness to submit to those standards and acknowledge
those limitations.
A. Lack of an Enforceable ProfessionalStandard
Until the early 1990s, the fire investigation community lacked a cohesive
standard of care. Procedures for conducting a comprehensive origin and cause
investigation were taken from a variety of separate books and publications.6
In 1992, the National Fire Protection Association ("NFPA") released its
first edition of NFPA 921: Guidefor Fire and Explosion Investigations("NFPA
921,,). NFPA 921 was developed to assist fire investigators throughout the
United States in the investigation and analysis of fire incidents and to aid in

6

See generally JOHN F. BOUDREAU ET AL., ARSON AND ARSON INVESTIGATION: SURVEY AND
(1977); FRANcIS BRANNIGAN, RICHARD BRIGHT & NORA JASON, FIRE INVESTIGATION

ASSESSMENT

HANDBOOK (1980); INT'L FIRE SERV. TRAINING ASS'N, FIRE CAUSE DETERMINATION (1 st ed.
PAUL KIRK, FIRE INVESTIGATION (1969).
7

NAT'L FIRE PROT. ASS'N, NFPA

(2014),

[hereinafter

NFPA

921]

1982);

921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS
http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-

standards/list-of-codes-and-standards?mode=code&code=921 &tab=about.
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drawing conclusions and rendering opinions as to the origin and cause of fires. 8
NFPA 921 presented the first established guidelines and recommendations for
the systematic investigation and analysis of fire incidents and contains specific
procedures to assist in the collection and analysis of evidence.
NFPA 921 emphasizes an understanding of fire behavior, fire pattern
analysis and the scientific method as the underpinnings of a comprehensive and
objective origin and cause investigation. 9 The emphasis it places on adherence to
the scientific method cannot be overstated. The guide lists and then elaborates
on the seven required steps of a repeating cycle of observation, hypothesis,
experimentation, and verification.10 These steps include: (1) Recognize the need
(identify the problem); (2) Define the problem; (3) Collect data; (4) Analyze the
data; (5) Develop a hypothesis; (6) Test the hypothesis; and (7) Select a final
hypothesis. 1
While its influence within the fire investigation community has steadily
grown, widespread acceptance of NFPA 921 was not immediate. Many fire
investigators countered NFPA 921's scientific approach with a culture that
believed fire investigation was more art than science.12
In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.13 that the Federal Rules of Evidence assign to the trial
judge the task of ensuring that scientific testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The Court also explained that in
order to make a determination regarding the reliability of a particular scientific
theory or technique, a trial judge should rely on such factors as testing, peer
review, error rates, and "acceptability" in the relevant scientific community.' 4
In the 1996 case of Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Corp. v.
Benfield,1 5 the International Association of Arson Investigators ("IAAI") 16 filed

8

For more information on the history and scope of NFPA 921, including access to current

and past editions, see id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 17.

11

Id.

12

See, e.g., Lentini, supra note 2.

13

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

14

Id.

140 F.3d 915 (11 th Cir. 1998) (questioning if the trial judge in a civil arson case incorrectly
applied Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. when excluding the plaintiff s expert fire
investigator's testimony. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to exclude the
expert testimony on the basis that it did not comply with the scientific method.).
IS

16 The International Association of Arson Investigators ("IAAI") is one of two large
professional organizations in the United States providing training and certification to fire
investigators, and offers the Certified Fire Investigator ("CFI") designation. The National
Association of Fire Investigators ("NAFI") offers the Certified Fire and Explosion ("CFEI")
designation.
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an amicus curiae brief in which it claimed that fire investigation expert testimony
should not be held to the standards developed under Daubert because fire
investigation is "less scientific." 17
Three years later, in 1999, the Supreme Court ruled in Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael,18 that a judge's Daubert obligations to determine the
admissibility of scientific testimony extended to all forms of expert testimony. 19
Kumho Tire marked the beginning of a broader acceptance of NFPA 921
amongst fire scientists and forensic engineers engaged in fire investigation, but
investment by fire investigators still lagged behind.
By 2000, NFPA 921 had gained broad acceptance in the scientific
community, but fire investigators in the field were still resistant. It was not until
the 2000 publication of U.S. Department of Justice, Fire and Arson Scene
Evidence: A Guide for Public Safety Personnel,which described NFPA 921 as
"a benchmark for the training and expertise of everyone who purports to be an
expert in the origin and cause determination of fires," that fire investigators
began to grudgingly accept the importance of NFPA 92 1.20
Along with the gradual acceptance of NFPA 921 by fire investigators
came an equally slow acknowledgement by fire investigation instructors that
NFPA 921 should be used as a core document in curriculum development. After
the publication of the DOJ report, with each new edition of NFPA 921, local,
state, and national fire investigation curriculums were incrementally adjusted to
reflect the changing procedures in fire investigation methodology. As the
document's influence grew, fire investigation course curricula slowly began to
of the scientific method and the
reflect a better understanding of the importance
21
fire phenomenon known as "flashover.
In 2007, the curriculum of the National Fire Academy's basic fire
investigation course, Fire/Arson Origin and Cause Investigation, experienced a
significant revision with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF"). This new
curriculum included a module entitled "Myths and Legends" specifically
designed to debunk some of the misconceptions associated with the
Brief for International Ass'n of Arson Investigators as Amici Curiae, Mich. Millers Mut.
Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998) (on file with authors); see also Fire
17

Investigation Not Junk Science, INVESTIGATION PROCESS RES. RESOURCE SITE (Nov. 16, 1997)

http://www.iprr.org/reviews/IAAI.html.
18 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
19

Id.

20

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE EVIDENCE: A GUIDE

FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL 6 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/181584.pdf.

See NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 16 ("[F]lashover" is the transition from a condition where
21
the fire is dominated by burning of the first item ignited (and nearby items subject to direct ignition)
to a condition where the fire is dominated by burning of all items in the compartment); see also id.
at 43-47 (explaining the development of flashover and the impact of flashover and full-roominvolvement on area of origin determination).
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interpretation of bum patterns and to reinforce a reliance on the scientific
method.22
Despite the eventual broad acceptance of NFPA 921 as the de facto
standard of care in fire investigation in state and federal courts, 23 it was not until
2013 that IAAI gave a guarded endorsement of the importance of NFPA 921. In
a January 2013 position statement, the IAAI acknowledged that NFPA 921 is
"widely recognized as an authoritative guide for the fire investigation
profession., 24 It went on to say that NFPA 921 is "an important reference
manual, and sets forth guidance and methodology regarding the determination of
the origin and cause
of fires," but stopped short of describing NFPA 921 as a
"standard of care., 25
The difference between "offering guidance" and being a "standard of
care," has a particular significance within the fire investigation community, and
IAAI's avoidance of the use of the word "standard" in describing NFPA 921's
role is not an oversight. Many fire investigators will quickly point out that
compliance with a guide, such as NFPA 921, is voluntary, and that by its very
title, NFPA 921 falls short of being a required standard.
Regardless of the fact that courts across the country have held NFPA 921
in a higher regard,26 the distinction fire investigators make between a guide and
a standard raises a troubling question: If NFPA 921 is simply a guide that can be
followed or ignored at the discretion of the fire investigator, then what standards

22
See
Fire
Investigation:
Essentials
R0206,
U.S.
FIRE
ADMIN.,
https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/nfacourses/catalog/details/38 (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
23
Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., No. 03-4195, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16306 (D. Kan.
Aug. 8,2005); TNT Rd. Co. v. Sterling Truck Corp., No. 03-37-B-K, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13463
(D. Me. July 19, 2004); Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Ohio 2004);
Tunnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 707 (W.D. Va. 2004); McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., 214
F.R.D. 646 (D. Kan. 2003); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Joseph Daniel Constr., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d
423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Snodgrass v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-1814, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13421
(D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2002); Chester Valley Coach Works v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 99 CV 4197, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15902 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2001); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec.
Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 360 (D. Conn. 2001); Abon, Ltd. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., No. 2004-CA-0029,
2005 WL 1414486 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 2005); State v. Schultz, 58 P.3d 879 (Utah Ct. App.
2002).

24

NFPA

921/1033 Position Statement, INT'L ASS'N

ARSON

INVESTIGATORS

INC.,

https://www.firearson.com/NFPA-9211033-Position-Statement/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 3,
2016).
25

Id.

26
See McCoy, 214 F.R.D. at 653 ("The 'gold standard' for fire investigation is codified in
NFPA 921, and its testing methodologies are well known in the fire investigation community and
familiar to the courts."); see also Werth v. Hill-Rom, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (D. Minn.
2012) (where the court excluded expert fire investigator testimony due to the expert's failure to
rely on NFPA 921: "Simply put, the experts' failure to disclose their reliance on NFPA 921-in
their initial Report, their Supplemental Report, their depositions, or at any other point in
discovery-would alone justify excluding their opinion").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/6

8

Dehghani-Tafti and Bieber: Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson Investigation and
2016]

FOLKLORE AND FORENSICS

actually exist within the field of fire investigation to control or limit the
methodologies, processes, or techniques used in forming expert conclusions
regarding the origin or cause of a fire? 27 The simple answer is that there are
none. 28 This answer is troubling both for pre-trial defendants accused of arson
and post-conviction appeals for those who maintain their innocence.
B. The Processof GatheringandInterpretingFire-SceneEvidence Is
Filledwith Human Error
While the guidance provided by NFPA 921 and scientific advances in
our understanding of fire behavior have begun to move the field of fire
investigation towards a more respected and scientific footing, several wellentrenched current practices in fire investigation keep it firmly tethered to the
past. These practices effectively prevent today's fire investigators from being
regarded by the broader forensic science community as real forensic
practitioners, and prevent fire investigation from being accepted as a true
forensic discipline.
When a fire bums, a great deal of evidence is damaged or destroyed.
Traditional forms of physical evidence, such as trace evidence, DNA, and
fingerprints, are often rendered unusable. However, as the heat of the fire
diminishes the value of some types of evidence, the fire itself creates a unique
class of evidence that has been used in determining the fire's origin and cause.
The examination of the evidence created by the fire, which includes
interpreting fire patterns and bum damage to determine how the patterns were
created, is termed "fire pattern analysis., 29 Through this process, and with an
understanding of the predictable dynamics and behavior of fire, a fire
investigator may begin to understand how the fire developed.3 °
However, fire pattern and dynamics analysis does not identify a suspect,
determine a motive, or even establish if a crime has occurred; these methods of
forensic examination are simply used to try to determine where the fire began
(its "area of origin") and the physical circumstances that caused it (its "cause").

27
See Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450 (8th Cir. 2012) ("NFPA 921 qualifies as 'a
reliable method endorsed by a professional organization,' ... but we have not held NFPA 921 is
the only reliable way to investigate a fire. Our NFPA 921 cases stand for the simple proposition an
expert who purports to follow NFPA 921 must apply its contents reliably." (citations omitted)).
28
The methodologies, standards, and practices discussed in this Article focus on fire-scene
examination and the techniques employed by the fire-scene investigator in determining the origin,
cause, and development of a fire. Other areas in the field of fire investigation, particularly fire
debris analysis based on Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry ("GC/MS") analysis and other
techniques of analytical chemistry, are more firmly grounded in science and do not suffer from the
same lack of standard protocols.
29
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 48.
30
Id. at 15.
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1. Origin Determination: The Flawed Processes for Gathering and
Interpreting Evidence
In a forensic fire scene examination, by far the most important
determination is the area of origin-where the fire began. Only after the area of
origin is accurately defined can an examination be undertaken to identify what
possible ignition sources, in or near that area, may have caused the fire.3 1 As a
result, the core competency of a fire scene investigator is to reliably and
accurately determine the area of origin of a fire.
There are four generally accepted techniques for acquiring information
that may assist in the determination of the fire's area of origin, each with their
own strengths and limitations: fire pattern analysis, fire dynamics analysis, arc
mapping, and witness statements.32
i.

FirePattern and FireDynamics Analysis

The first two techniques for determining the origin of a fire-fire pattern
and fire dynamics analysis-are inextricably linked and therefore may be
considered together.3 3 The most common method used by fire investigators to
determine the area of origin is "fire pattern analysis." In this process, an
investigator examines and interprets the shape, depth, texture, location, and
overall appearance of the effects and patterns made by the heat of the fire on
walls, ceilings, floors, or furniture, and tries to understand how the patterns were
created.34
If accurately interpreted, this analysis can provide the fire investigator
with valuable information regarding the location of the burning item or items that
created the patterns. The knowledge gained from fire pattern and fire dynamics
analysis can be used to determine the fire's growth and progression. NFPA 921
explains the basic concepts of fire behavior and lists various common fire
patterns and effects created in normal room fires, including "V-pattems," depth
of char, lines of demarcation, soot and smoke deposits, and others.3 5
When a fire grows and several items burn simultaneously, each creating
its own bum patterns, fire pattern analysis becomes more complicated. General

31
32

Id. at 186.
Id.

33
Although NFPA 921 listsfire patternsandfire dynamics as separate sources of information,
the two methods of data acquisition are intertwined. The physics and chemistry of fire ignition and
growth (fire dynamics) are what result in the fire patterns to be analyzed, while the fire patterns
are a direct reflection of the fire dynamics that caused them. For that reason, this Article deals with
fire pattern analysis and fire dynamics analysis as a single source of information for area of origin
determination.
34
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 48.
35
Id. at 22-75.
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rules of thumb, such as assuming that the deepest char, greatest amount of burn
damage, or presence of a V-pattern indicates the area of origin, can be
misleading.
A complicating factor in the determining the area of origin is a condition
known as "flashover." 36 Flashover is a transient phase in an enclosed room fire
where the temperature rises so high throughout the room that combustible items
begin to burn, even at floor level and in areas away from the fire's origin. As a
fire approaches flashover, the hot smoke layer which forms along the ceiling
radiates heat downward towards the floor. Eventually, if the circumstances are
right, any combustible items in the room exposed to the radiated heat from the
37
hot smoke layer will ignite nearly simultaneously.
Flashover conditions quickly transition to "full room involvement." This
is the point in a fire's progression where ventilation-generated fire patterns can
create conflicting bum damage and fire patterns throughout the room that can
distort or mask the true area of origin.38 Fire damage created by ventilation can
be, and often is, deeper, lower and more pronounced than fire damage in the
fire's area of origin, leading even experienced fire investigators to easily
misidentify the fire's area of origin.
The bum patterns created in the early stages of fire development-those
patterns likely to be in or near the fire's area of origin-may or may not persist
through flashover and full room involvement. As well as creating new bum
patterns throughout the compartment, full room involvement conditions often
obscure or destroy the burn patterns in or near the area of origin which would
have been observable had the fire been extinguished prior to flashover.39

36

Id.at 45.

37

See generally id. at 45-48 (a comprehensive discussion and explanation of flashover and

full room involvement and their effects); see also STEVEN W. CARMAN, IMPROVING THE
UNDERSTANDING

OF

POST-FLASHOVER

FIRE

BEHAVIOR

[hereinafter

IMPROVING

THE

UNDERSTANDING],

https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedfiles/files/resource-center/topics/Post-conviction/atf sa carman
_post-flashover fires isfij08.pdf ; STEVEN W. CARMAN, PROGRESSIVE BURN PATTERN
DEVELOPMENT
IN POST-FLASHOVER FIRES
(2009)
[hereinafter
PROGRESSIVE
BURN],

http://carmanfireinvestigations.com/dl/(Carman&Associates)%20%20Progressive%2OBum%2oPattern%2ODevelopment%20in%2OPost-Flashover%20Fires.pdf;
GREG GORBETT & RONALD HOPKINS, THE CURRENT KNOWLEDGE & TRAINING REGARDING
BACKDRAFT,

FLASHOVER, AND OTHER RAPID FIRE PROGRESSION PHENOMENA (2007),
https://online.columbiasouthem.edu/CSUContent/courses/Emergency-Services/BFS/BFS325 1/

11 F/UnitIII_SupplementalReadingTheCurrentKnowledgeTraining.pdf;

PATRICK M. KENNEDY &

KATHRYN KENNEDY, FLASHOVER AND FIRE ANALYSIS: A DISCUSSION OF THE PRACTICAL USE OF
FLASHOVER
IN
FIRE
INVESTIGATION
(2003),

http://www.experts.com/content/articles/PatrickKennedy-Flashover-andFire
38
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 45-48.
39

Analysis.pdf.

Id. at 53.
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ii. Arc Mapping

NFPA 921 describes arc mapping as a "technique in which the
investigator uses the identification of arc locations or 'sites' to aid in determining
the area of fire origin., 40 Arc mapping is an interpretation of the spatial
relationship of specific forensic artifacts on energized electrical conductors that
were damaged by heat during the course of the fire. Those forensic artifacts are
created when the heat of a fire causes an "arc ', 41 in an electrical circuit. The
location of these arc sites in relation to the building, the electrical system, and
each other, combined with an understanding of the sequence in which they were
created, has been used to support an area of origin determination.
Arc mapping relies on four fundamental principles: (1) "The predictable
behavior of energized electrical circuits exposed to a spreading fire"; (2) the
ability of the fire investigator to locate and identify all of the relevant arc sites;
(3) the ability of the fire investigator to distinguish, through sight and touch,
between the damage caused by an electrical arc and similar damage caused by
localized melting of the conductor; and (4) the ability of the fire investigator to
recognize and correctly interpret the locations and spatial relationship of the
identified arc sites to inform an understanding of where the fire began.42
To date, no published research exists that measures the accuracy or error
rate of any of these principles, much less a fire investigator's ability to bring
these factors together to actually figure out where a fire started based on the arc
mapping methodology.
Perhaps because of its unknown value in informing an area of origin
conclusion, NFPA 921 does not describe arc mapping as a standalone
methodology to determine where a fire began, advising instead that arc mapping
"can be used in combination with other data to more clearly define the area of
43
origin.
iii.Witness Statements

The way in which the fire investigator approaches the use of witness
information, and how a witness statement influences the investigator's final
conclusions, remains a subject of some controversy in the fire investigation
community. NFPA 921 supports the use of witness information as a legitimate

40

Id. at 196.

Id. (an electrical arc is "a high-temperature luminous electrical discharge across a gap or
through a medium such as charred insulation").
Id. Also, for more information on the impact of ventilation on fire pattern development and
42
fire pattern persistence, see generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. FIRE ADMIN., USFA
FIRE BURN PATTERN TESTS: UNITED STATES FIRE ACADEMY PUBLICATION #FA- 178 (Kennedy et al.
eds., 1997).
43
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 196.
41
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source of data to be analyzed,4 but provides conflicting information on just how
a witness statement can and should be used by a fire investigator in forming an
expert conclusion on where a fire began. It goes on to describe the utility of
witness observations in determining the origin of the fire,45 but cautions that
"witness statements regarding the location of the origin create a need for the fire
investigator to conduct as thorough an investigation as possible to collect data
that can support or refute the witness statements.,, 46 Most importantly, if the
"witness statements are not supported by the investigator's interpretation of the
physical evidence, the investigator should evaluate each separately. 47 How
NFPA 921 squares the imperfect and often unverifiable nature of a witness
statement with its general reliance on empirical data remains unclear.4 8
Fire investigation is not the only forensic domain that grapples with the
effects of witness statements on expert conclusions. Forensic pathologists trying
to determine the cause and manner of death often find themselves confronting
the same dilemma,49 and their conclusions, like those of a fire investigator, often
span the gap between opinions based on forensic and medical science and those
based on circumstantial evidence. And like fire investigators, forensic
pathologists often view themselves more as crime fighting detectives rather than
objective forensic examiners.
The parallels between death scene and fire scene investigation go further
still: In the same way that the origin and cause of a fire are determined through
the application of scientific principles to an examination of fire scene evidence,
the cause of death is primarily determined by applying the principles of science
and medicine in an examination of the body, usually an autopsy or a laboratory
test. In other words, determining the cause of death, like finding the origin and
cause of a fire, is a forensic discipline which relies on an objective application of
the scientific method. However, classifying the cause of death as accidental,
natural, suicide, or homicide (like the classification of the cause of a fire as
accidental, natural, or incendiary) is not a forensic or scientific conclusion, and
not truly an expert opinion at all. Whereas the determination of cause of death is

Id. at 186.
Id. at 191 ("Such witnesses can provide knowledge of conditions prior to, during, and after
the fire event. Witnesses may be able to provide photographs or videotapes of the scene before or
during the fire. Observations are not necessary limited to visual observations. Sounds, smells, and
perceptions of heat may shed light on the origin.").
44

45

46

Id.

47

Id.
Id. at 19.
49
See
generally
Glossary,
HARRIS
COUNTY
INST.
FORENSIC
SCI.,
http://ifs.harriscountytx.gov/Pages/Glossary.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) ("Cause of Death is
the disease or injury responsible for the lethal sequence of events ... Manner of Death explains
how the cause of death arose" and is a classification of the cause of death: Natural; Accident;
Homicide; Suicide; or Undetermined).
48
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reached through the expert application of scientific principles and medical
knowledge to the examination of physical and empirical evidence through
autopsy and laboratory evaluations, the classification of the cause of death (the
manner of death) is found through a common sense evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances, often including the statements of eyewitnesses. 50 The same
issue regularly arises in fire investigation.
In more well established forensic domains, the issue of using witness
statements to influence expert conclusions is more clear-cut. Imagine a DNA
analyst being asked to examine a blood sample taken from a crime-scene and
compare it to the genetic profiles of a suspect and a victim. For whatever reason,
the results of the DNA analysis are somewhat inconclusive; the analyst is able to
clearly identify the victim's blood in the sample, but unable to either include or
exclude the suspect as the additional contributor. Now imagine that the police
then explain to the analyst that they have a credible eyewitness who saw the
entire incident and that because of that statement, the only possible donors to the
blood sample evidence are the victim and the known suspect.
The question becomes, how should the analyst use this witness
information in her evaluation of the evidence? In DNA analysis (and every other
serious discipline of forensic science) the answer is clear. In fire investigation, it
is not.
As explained above, NFPA 921 generally supports the use of witness
statements as a technique for assisting in the area of origin determination, 51 and
fire investigators routinely testify that their analysis of witness statements plays
an important role in their investigations and conclusions.
But, this broad endorsement by NFPA 921 does little to assist the fire
investigator in understanding when a witness's statement crosses the line
between providing reliable data useful for developing an investigative
hypothesis, and providing unverifiable information which often morphs, in the
State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 2015). The suspicious death of a newborn in 2011
provides an example. See id. When Baby Tyler's body, a piece of the umbilical cord, and the
placenta were examined by a medical examiner from the State Medical Examiner's office, no clear
cause of death was apparent. Id. at 148. After performing an autopsy and pathology examination,
the medical examiner concluded that the cause and manner of the baby's death were
"undetermined." Id.
However, in his final report, he attributed the cause of death to "[b]athtub drowning" and classified
the cause of death as "[h]omicide." Id. His report said that he based his final conclusions on an
external and internal examination of the body, as well as statements made by the baby's mother to
the police. Id. His report stated, "The mother claimed she had given birth the previous day in the
motel room and then placed the infant in a bathtub partially filled with water shortly after the birth."
Id. At a hearing to suppress the medical examiner's testimony regarding the cause and manner of
death, the pathologist conceded in response from questioning by defense counsel that he could not
have determined cause and manner of death from the autopsy alone but did so on the bias of the
mother's confession to the police. Id. at 150; see id. at 148-53.
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 186 ("The analysis of observations reported by persons who
51
witnessed the fire or were aware of conditions present at the time of the fire.").
50
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mind of the investigator, into the final conclusion. The guide contains no
warnings regarding the potential introduction of domain-irrelevant and
potentially biasing information that occurs when a witness interview goes
beyond where the fire started and turns to who started it and why.
C. The Longer It Burns, the Greaterthe Opportunityfor Error
As explained previously, the basic process of determining a fire's area
of origin is to examine and interpret the very damage that the fire itself creates.
In its earliest stage, the damage caused by a fire, at least at first, is isolated to
where the fire began. If the fire is extinguished early in its development,
determining its area of origin by interpreting fire patterns can be a fairly
straightforward process. But, as a fire grows, the evidence it creates becomes
more complex-fire patterns and bum damage begin to conflict, conflate, and
compete with the earlier patterns, making interpretation more difficult and
subjective. Common fire conditions, such as flashover, full room involvement,
ceiling collapse, and overhaul,5 2 produce extremely complex fire scenes.
The limited research in the field of area of origin determination suggests
that when this type of complex fire scene is examined by several independent
fire investigators, they will draw different conclusions. When the same forensic
methodology (in this case fire -pattern analysis or arc mapping) is applied to the
same piece of physical evidence (the fire-scene and the evidence it contains) and
produces inconsistent expert conclusions, this is the very definition of an
unreliable methodology. 53 That is not to say that the investigators are unreliable
or untrustworthy, only that the methodologies being employed simply do not
have the capacity to produce consistent and accurate results. Moreover, it signals
the point in fire-scene examination when forensic expert opinions regarding the
fire's area of origin begin to lose their value.
At various points in the lifespan of a fire, as fire-related evidence goes
from clearly defined (as is the case with a fire that is limited in space and
duration), to complex (which occurs when a fire expands to the point it destroys
some evidence or introduces multiple theories of origin and causation), to
completely destroyed (as is the case in a large fire that destroys all evidence), the
efficacy and scientific foundation of fire pattern analysis is at first reliable, then

52
Id. at 17 ("Overhaul: A firefighting term involving the process of final extinguishment after
the main body of the fire has been knocked down. All traces of fire must be extinguished at this
time.").
53
Throughout this Article the words "reliability" and "validity" are used, as they are in
forensic science generally, to mean consistency and accuracy; that is, a reliable methodology is
one which has the capacity to return consistent and repeatable results, and validity means an
accurate result which reflects the ground truth. For more on the subject of reliability and validity
in forensic examinations (specifically in the field of fingerprint comparison) see generally Simon

A. Cole, Is FingerprintIdentification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in FingerprintProponents'
Discourse,28 L. & POL'Y 109 (2006).
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marginalized, and then completely lost. The question of when that point is
reached, and how that point is recognized, remains unanswered in the fire
investigation community.
By contrast, the field of fingerprint comparison has recognized that the
underlying reliability of a fingerprint comparison is, to a large degree, a
reflection of the quality of the latent print being evaluated. A review of the level
of damage to the source evidence being examined has been built into that field's
standard protocol. In fact, the crucial first step in evaluating an unknown (latent)
fingerprint is to determine if it contains sufficient information to be used for a
comparison. If the print is not suitable for comparison-due to damage, lack of
clarity, or anything else that diminishes the quality or quantity of usable
information contained in the print-the examination ends because there is
insufficient information on which to base a reliable analysis.54
In this way, fingerprint examiners have at least made some attempt to
overcome a fundamental concern in forensic science-what to do when the
evidence being examined is damaged or degraded to such a degree that the
methodologies of the domain no longer apply or lack the capacity to provide
reliable results. When this condition occurs in a fingerprint comparison, the
examination ends. When it occurs at a fire scene examination, the investigator
presses on.
1. Reliability and Validity of Area of Origin Determination
The

Supreme

Court's

decision

in Daubert v.

Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals,Inc. ,55 assigned to the trial judge the role of "gatekeeper" in

assessing the reliability of the principles and methods used by an expert witness
proffering testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.56 Under
Daubert,the trial judge is not attempting to measure the accuracy of the expert's
conclusions, simply the reliability of the methodologies employed.57 The
Supreme Court developed a list of five factors to assist the trial judge in making

54
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK
9-13 (2011),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/225320.pdf.
55
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
56
Rule 702 allows a jury to hear expert testimony when the expert's opinions are based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will help the jury to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. See FED. R. EVID. 702. In order to qualify under Rule 702,
the expert's testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and those methods
must have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. Id.
57

NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH

FORWARD 96 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] ("[I]f one focuses solely on federal appellate

decisions, the picture is not appealing to those who have preferred a more rigorous application of
Daubert. Federal appellate courts have not with any consistency or clarity imposed standards
ensuring the application of scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal
cases involving Daubertquestions.").
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this preliminary assessment.5 8 Included amongst these factors is the error rate for
the methodology being used.
The National Academy of Sciences 2009 report, StrengtheningForensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward,also emphasizes the importance
of understanding the rate of accuracy and error, and concludes that these are not
known in many forensic domains. 59 The report provides two important insights
in considering the weight to be given to scientific evidence and testimony:
(1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is founded
on a reliable scientific methodology that gives it the capacity to
accurately analyze evidence and report findings and (2) the
extent to which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline
rely on human interpretation that could be tainted by error, the
threat of bias, or the absence of sound operational procedures
and robust performance standards.6 °
The NAS Report's caution against the threat of human error and bias in
distorting scientific methodology is particularly relevant to fire investigation
because fire pattern analysis is based almost entirely on human interpretation.
Unlike some forensic domains that rely on objective quantification and scientific
measurement, the analysis, importance, and underlying cause of a fire pattern or
damage to a piece of fire debris, as well as a determination of how a fire
developed based on those patterns and damage, is highly dependent on the
subjective interpretation of the examiner. At a fire scene, the human examiner is
the sole instrument of analysis.
The recent publication Forensic Science in Criminal Court: Ensuring
Scientific Validity ofFeature-ComparisonMethods,6 1 by the President's Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology ("PCAST"), goes further still. The report
recognizes that expert testimony in forensic disciplines that lack well-defined
are unknown is potentially
values of foundational reliability and where error rates 62
misleading and of little to no value in informing a jury.
Proficiency testing within the fire investigation community with
performance data and criteria are yet to be developed. And, while NFPA 921

58

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95 ((1) whether the theory of technique in question can be and

has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its known or
potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and
(5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community).
59
NAS REPORT, supra note 57.
60
Id. at 9.
61

See generally ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SC.

& TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
OF
VALIDITY
SCIENTIFIC

FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING
(2016),
MODELS
FEATURE-COMPARISON

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast-forensic-science-re
port final.pdf.
62

Id.
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attempts to provide a systematic process for determining a fire's origin by
examining fire patterns and arc sites, the reliability and accuracy of these
methodologies remain largely unknown.
The unreliability of current methodologies for determining fire origin
was dramatically demonstrated in a live-fire exercise conducted by ATF in 2005,
in which it found that the accuracy of fire investigators' determinations of the
correct quadrant of origin in a room fire that had burned two minutes past the
onset of flashover was less than 6%.63 A similar set of exercises conducted at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center had an accuracy rate that hovered
between 8 and 10%.64 In a follow-up exercise in 2007, three similarly constructed
and furnished rooms were burned 30 seconds, 70 seconds, and 180 seconds past
the onset of flashover and full room involvement. The accuracy of fire
investigators in determining the
correct quadrant of origin in these fires was 84%,
65
69%, and 25%, respectively.
Follow-up review of these exercises showed that errors in determining
the correct area of origin were largely attributable to fire investigators applying
pre-flashover fire pattern analysis to a post-flashover fire scene that had
experienced full room involvement conditions.66
Additional research has shown that during the full room involvement
following flashover, ventilation patterns become the dominant factor in the
creation of fire patterns, not the location of burning objects as is the case in a preflashover environment.67 In other words, during flashover and full room
involvement, fire patterns and the amount of burn damage on walls, ceilings,
floors, and pieces of furniture will be primarily the result of air flow currents
through the room and have absolutely no bearing on the area of origin of the fire.
This research also showed that bum patterns near the area of origin created early
in the fire's progression (prior to the onset of flashover) sometimes remained
visible during and after the onset of flashover and sometimes did not.68
A broader and more rigorous study, involving over 600 fire
investigators, provided some data on the accuracy of area of origin
determination. This study revealed that approximately 75% of the participants69
were able to choose the correct general area of origin in a post-flashover fire.
For this study, a room was lightly furnished, allowed to burn only one minute
63

See generally IMPROVING THE UNDERSTANDING, supra note 37.

64

Id.

65

Lentini, supra note 2, at 18.

66

See generally PROGRESSIVE BURN, supra note 37.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

See generally ANDREW T. TINSLEY & GREGORY E. GORBETT, FIRE INVESTIGATION ORIGIN

DETERMINATION

SURVEY

(2013),

http://fireandarsoninvestigation.eku.edu/sites/fireandarsoninvestigation.eku.edu/files/origin-surv
ey-resubmission.pdf/.
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past flashover, and care was taken not to disturb the fire scene during
extinguishment and overhaul. 70 Even under these ideal circumstances, postflashover area of origin determination had an error rate of approximately 25%.71
This means that a quarter of the time investigators could be searching for a cause
of the fire in the wrong location.
While there has been surprisingly little research to measure the reliability
and validity of origin determination based on fire pattern analysis, corresponding
research to measure the accuracy or error rate of arc-mapping in area of origin
determination is even sparser. Indeed, it is completely non-existent. This is not
to say that fire-pattern and arc-mapping analysis has no value, under some
circumstances, as methods to identify a fire's area of origin. However, in the
absence of any serious research to measure the reliability and validity of these
techniques, their utility in assisting a fire investigator in establishing where a fire
began-the single most important finding in conducting a forensic fire scene
examination-is simply unknown.
What is clear from the studies and the ATF exercises described above is
that the general reliability and accuracy of fire investigators determining the
correct area of origin in a room fire that has burned beyond flashover by
analyzing the remaining bum patterns, even under best case circumstances,
cannot be established to the degree of certainty needed for courtroom testimony.
Yet, this is exactly the type of testimony routinely accepted by state and federal
courts across the country.
For a fire investigator to testify in court in compliance with NFPA 921
that a fire started in a particular location, or that a particular ignition source
started it, he must believe only that his conclusion isprobablycorrect-i.e., more
likely than not.72 The guide provides no reference point on which to base this
certainty other than to say it should be greater than 50%. 73 In a forensic domain,
effectively absent any known rates of accuracy or error, how that 51% certainty
is recognized-like most of the processes of modem fire investigation-is
completely in the hands (and the mind) of the individual investigator. Also of
concern, NFPA 921 provides no instruction on the importance of informing a
jury that expert conclusions in the field of fire investigation may rest on a level
of certainty that barely breaks even.74

70
71

Id.
Id.

NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 21 (describes two levels of certainty to be used as thresholds
for a fire investigator in holding and expressing an expert opinion, "Possible" and "Probable").
73
Id.
74
See People v. Pike, 2015 IL App (1 st) (holding that the testimony of a DNA expert regarding
a conclusion with a 50% probability statistic did not even meet the evidentiary threshold of
relevance). The 50% threshold of certainty called for by NFPA 921 falls well below accepted
probability statistics for other forensic disciplines.
72
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When fire scene conditions move beyond "best case circumstances"due to longer burn times, movement of contents during overhaul, or the
additional damage and burning caused by ceiling or building collapse-the
accuracy of determining where the fire first began diminishes even further.
However, fire investigators routinely use these tools (fire pattern and fire
dynamics analysis, arc-mapping, and witness statements) to determine where the
fire first began even at the most destructive fires--even at fires where the room
where the fire began has been completely gutted by fire or the entire building has
burned to the ground and the first fire patterns created (those that might give a
clue to where the fire actually began) have been destroyed.
D. Cause Determination:The Flawed Processesfor InterpretingEvidence
Once a fire investigator narrows down the area where the fire began, the
next step in the process is to search that area for a potential heat or ignition
source. In practical terms, this means searching through the rubble and debris in
and near the fire's area of origin for any possible heat or ignition sources that
may have started the fire and then matching each potential source to an
appropriate fuel found in the same location. Like origin determination, NFPA
921 demands that the fire investigator use the scientific method to determine a
fire's cause.75
Identifying the cause of a fire involves first identifying and matching a
"competent ignition source" with an appropriate "first fuel ignited." Then, a fire
investigator must account for "the circumstances
or agencies that brought the
76
ignition source in contact with the first fuel.
Narrowing down and separating which ignition source actually played a
role in starting the fire from those ignition sources that were just coincidentally
found nearby usually includes some application of the process of elimination.77
The idea here is for the investigator to examine and exclude those ignition
sources that did not start the fire, allowing the investigator to focus her attention
on those remaining sources of ignition that cannot be eliminated.
Each remaining ignition source then forms the basis of a separate
hypothesis. The investigator evaluates each competing hypothesis and searches
for evidence to prove or disprove each one.78 This involves evaluating each
possible ignition source and each hypothesized ignition sequence for evidence
that tends to support or refute it as a reasonable explanation for what caused the
fire.79

75

NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 199.

76

Id.

77
78

Id. at 203.
Id. at 202.

79

Id.
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How an investigator approaches this process of examination, evaluation,
elimination, and inclusion is left entirely to the individual investigator. NFPA
921 provides little guidance on how to separate ignition sources between those
that did not start the fire from those that may have started the fire, and finally to
the more definitive category of one that actually did start the fire. Moreover,
the
80
level of certainty needed to form a final conclusion is surprisingly low.
1. Reliability and Validity of Cause Determination
Even if we assume that all potential heat or ignition sources in the area
of origin are found and identified, the investigator's ability to accurately
distinguish the ignition source that did start the fire from those that did not is
completely unknown. The investigator is left to his or her own devices as to how
to approach examining any particular ignition source for evidence of failure,
misuse, or misapplication that may have led to a fire. Specific forensic artifacts
or evidence showing that a particular ignition source actually started a fire, rather
than simply being damaged by the fire, are often not present, and when they are
present, their interpretation is remarkably subjective.
To put it simply, very often the true ignition source of a fire is
indistinguishable from any other potential ignition sources found nearby. As the
amount of fire damage to the items increases, so does the difficulty in
distinguishing between damage that was the result of the item causing the fire
and damage resulting from the fire itself. Interpreting the subtle differences in
appearance between an item that ignited a fire from an equally damaged item
that was simply damaged by the fire (assuming any differences, subtle or
otherwise, actually exist), and measuring an investigator's ability to accurately
do so, is a field of forensic science that currently provides more questions than
answers and is in desperate need of further research. But, these are the questions
fire investigators are expected to answer on a regular basis, at nearly every fire
scene.
Like area of origin determination, the ability of a fire investigator to
accurately identify which ignition source did or did not cause a fire is completely
unknown. The unwritten methodology for approaching this challenge is a series
of deeply subjective judgment calls where the primary measuring tool employed
is the mind of the investigator. And as the amount of damage to any given piece
of evidence increases through exposure to the fire, so too does the level of
subjectivity in interpreting its meaning. And like fire pattern analysis, there is no
agreed upon threshold of damage beyond which a fire investigator is prevented
from performing this critical assessment.
This is precisely the type of expert opinion that the NAS and the PSAT
reports warn of-where an imprecise methodology combines with a high degree

80

People v. Pike, 2015 IL App (1st).
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of human interpretation and an unknown error rate to create a process poised to
be derailed by bias and simple human error.
2. Cause Determination in a Misidentified Area of Origin
Whatever the issues and challenges surrounding the determination of a
fire's cause, this does not begin to confront the problem encountered when the
fire's area of origin is misidentified and the fire investigator finds himself
searching for the ignition source in an entirely wrong location. Three competing
issues arise during such a scenario: (1) finding the true ignition source will be
impossible because it is not there; (2) other likely ignition sources (including the
true ignition source) located outside of the misidentified area of origin will be
immediately dismissed and prematurely excluded because they were not found
in the precise area where the fire was believed to have begun; (3) and finding no
evidence of a competent ignition source in the misidentified area of origin, the
fire investigator is likely to imply an unwarranted level of suspicion to the
incident-a suspicion not based on affirmative evidence but on a lack of
evidence.
This circumstance and its downstream implications present one of the
most serious controversies in modem fire investigation and a clear example of
fire investigation's separation from more mainstream and well accepted forensic
disciplines: the continued and common practice amongst fire investigators of
basing expert opinions on the absence of evidence.
3. Negative Corpus
A fundamental component of determining a fire's cause is the
application of the process of elimination. 81 The process of elimination demands
that the fire investigator examine, consider, and challenge every reasonable
hypothesis of how the fire may have begun. So in a search for an ignition source,
the process of elimination actually involves the development and testing of
alternate hypotheses of how the fire began and what ignition sources may have
been involved. 82 As alternate hypotheses are considered and challenged, some
possibilities withstand the challenge and others are eliminated. This process of
elimination (including development, testing, disproving, and eliminating
alternative hypotheses) is "an integral part of the scientific method,, 83 and is
conducted at nearly every fire scene.
A serious problem arises when the process of elimination alone is used
not just to eliminate other competing hypotheses, but also to prove a single
remaining hypothesis in the absence of any evidence directly supporting the final
81

NFPA 921, supra note 7,at 202.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 203.
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conclusion. This method is so common in fire investigation84 that a unique term of
art has been developed to describe it: "Negative Corpus."
The most commonly paired results of the Negative Corpus methodology
are when a fire investigator concludes that a fire's ignition source was an "open
flame," and that the fire's cause classification was, therefore, "incendiary." Here
is how it works: A fire investigator determines, for instance, that a fire began in
the northeast comer of the living room. A search of the northeast comer reveals
no evidence of the ignition source that started the fire. Based on an absence of
an ignition source commonly associated with an accidental fire (such as a heater,
electric lamp, extension cord, cigarettes, or candles), the fire investigator, using
the process of elimination, decides that the fire must have been ignited with a
match or a lighter that was then removed from the scene. Fire investigators call
such an unidentified source an "open flame."
In this example, the potential ignition sources (heater, lamp, cigarettes,
candle, etc.) were all excluded because there was no evidence to support that any
of them were involved. Then, based on the same complete lack of evidenceand applying the Negative Corpus methodology-the fire investigator concludes
that the ignition source was, therefore, an "open flame." And to take the process
one step further in the mind of the investigator, with all of the ignition sources
commonly associated with an accidental fire excluded, and following the same
Negative Corpus process, the fire is found, therefore, to have been intentionally
set.
Recent editions of NFPA 921 have rejected Negative Corpus as a clear
violation of the scientific method. 85 However, it continues to be widely employed
by fire investigators and continues to provide an avenue for forensic experts to
arrive at expert conclusions based wholly on a lack of evidence.
Fire investigators also base expert conclusions on an utter lack of
physical evidence in other ways. Consider the case of Michael Bryant, convicted
in 2002 of murder, arson, and burglary.8 6
At Bryant's trial, a private fire investigator brought in by local
prosecutors to determine the fire's origin and cause testified that gasoline had

84 For a good discussion and clear analysis of Negative Corpus, see Russ v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America, No. 2:11CV195-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 1310501 (S.D. Miss. June 14, 2013).
85 NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 203 ("The process of determining the ignition source for a fire,
by eliminating all ignition sources found, known, or believed to have been present in the area of
origin, and then claiming such methodology is proof of an ignition source for which there is no
supporting evidence of its existence, is referred to by some investigators as negative corpus...
[Negative Corpus] is not consistent with the scientific method, is inappropriate, and should not be
used because it generates untestable hypotheses, and may result in incorrect determinations of the
ignition source and first fuel ignited. Any hypotheses formulated for the casual factors (e.g., first
fuel, ignition source, and ignition sequence), must be based on the analysis of facts. Those facts
are derived from evidence, observations, calculations, experiments, and the laws of science.
Speculative information cannot be included in the analysis.").
86 Bryant v. State, 651 S.E.2d 718 (Ga. 2007).
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been poured throughout the mobile home and ignited to cover up the evidence of
the murder victim discovered in the bathroom. 87 But, although Bryant had a
strong alibi-multiple witnesses had seen him at a movie and dinner with his
wife, placing him miles from the trailer at the time of the fire-it would be of no
use because the fire investigator claimed that a fire could be lit using a delayed
ignition device.88 Using such a device, the arsonist could pour the gasoline, set
the device, and then leave the scene prior to the fire's ignition. The investigator
such a delay device could be rigged to ignite the fire hours or even
claimed that
89
days later.

The only problem with this theory was that there was no physical
evidence of a delay device recovered at the fire scene. The fire investigator told
90
the jury that a delay device could be constructed that would leave no evidence.
After examining and eliminating other ignition sources in the trailer, and finding
no evidence of a delay device, the fire investigator concluded that the ignition
source must have been a type of delay device that leaves no evidence. 9 1 Here, the
lack of any evidence was all the evidence he needed.
4. The Use of Accelerant Detecting Canines
Searching a fire scene and finding evidence of an ignitable liquid in a
suspicious location is an understandably large focus in the field of fire
investigation. If a jury is convinced that traces of gasoline were found at the scene
of the fire, the road to a guilty verdict for arson can be short and straight.
Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry ("GC/MS") provides the fire
investigator with reliable and accurate laboratory confirmation of trace amounts
of a wide range of ignitable liquids that might be found in a fire debris sample.
But, at a large fire scene, the problem faced by the fire investigator is where to
take the sample-in the charred remains of a house fire, where are the most likely
places a liquid accelerant might be found, and where should a sample be taken?
In 1986, the Connecticut State Police and the ATF developed a pilot
program to train dogs to search fire scenes for ignitable liquid residue. The first
accelerant detection canine ("ADC") trained under the program was a Labrador
Retriever trained to respond (or "alert") to 17 different odors of ignitable liquids

89

Id. at 722-23.
See id. at 723.
See id.

90

See id. at 726.

91

See id. at 726-27.

87
88
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commonly used as accelerants.9 2 Over time, the training program grew and there
are now over 130 certified ADC teams in use around the country.93
As the program grew, so did the confidence shown by ADC handlers in
their dogs' ability to search for and find extremely small amounts of ignitable
liquids among the charred remains of a fire scene. Many ADC handlers will say
with absolute confidence that their dogs' noses are more sensitive to the presence
of ignitable liquids than GC/MS analysis and that their dogs are 100% accurate.94
When it comes to comparing the sensitivity of a well-trained ADC to
that of modem GC/MS regarding the presence of ignitable liquid residue, the
research results are mixed, and which technique is more sensitive is the subject
of controversy. What is known is that they are both quite sensitive and can
accurately detect even very small quantities of ignitable liquids.95
However, in a fire-scene examination, the sensitivity of the ADC is not
the substantive issue. Far more important is the dog's ability to discriminate
between the chemical compounds contained in the ignitable liquid that the dog
is trained to detect, and very similar or identical chemical compounds contained
See
History
of
Accelerant
Detection
Canines,
USFA,
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/prevention/outreach/canine/history.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
93
According to the State Farm Arson Dog Training Program, as of February 1, 2016, there
were 85 active and certified ADC teams trained through the State Farm Arson Dog Program
working throughout the United States and Canada (80 in the United States; 5 in Canada), Active
Teams, STATE FARM, http://arsondog.org/about/active-teams/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016); and as of
May 2015, there were an additional 50 teams trained by ATF, Accelerant andExplosives Detection
92

Canines,

BUREAU

ALCOHOL,

TOBACCO,

FIREARMS

&

EXPLOSIVES,

https://www.atf.gov/explosives/accelerant-and-explosives-detection-canines (last visited Nov. 3,
2016). There are an unknown number of privately trained teams.
94
See Videotaped Deposition of Captain Fred Dean Andes at 37-38, 78, Sloan v. Farmers Ins.
Co., CV 2009-033244, 2012 WL 6755780 (Ariz. Super. Dec. 10, 2012) (regarding 100% accuracy:
"Q: So in every case--every situation where [ADC] Sadie has alerted to the presence of an
accelerant, that accelerant is present, that's your testimony? A: That's my testimony... Q: Youryour-your belief is that the dog is 100 percent reliable? A: I believe when the dog alerts, the dog is
smelling an accelerant. Q: So that the dog is 100 percent reliable when she alerts to the presence
of an accelerant? A: I believe when the dog alerts there is an accelerant present. Q: And what's the
basis of that belief'? A: We were taught in Maine that the dog is always right, and through trial and
error and experience, I have learned that to be true. And with my tremendous amount of training
with the dog, I find that all to be true;" regarding ADC being more sensitive than the lab: "Q: How
many times has [ADC] Sadie alerted to the presence of an accelerant that was later not confirmed
by the crime lab? A: I don't know. Q: Do you keep those statistics? A: No. Q: Why not? A: I don't
feel the need to. Q: Don't you think that's relevant to her reliability? A: No. Q: Why not? A: I
believe she's far superior to what the labs can do. Q: Explain me-for me the basis of that belief that
she's far superior than a machine in a crime lab. A: From my basic training in Maine we worked
with chemists there who taught us that, gave us examples of that. My daily training with her, I
realized that she can hit very minute amounts. My continued reading and knowledge on the subject
gives information to lead to the same conclusion.") (transcript on file with authors).
95
See generally Michael E. Kurz et al., Evaluation of Caninesfor Accelerant Detection atFire
Scenes, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1528 (1994); Reta Tindall & Kevin Lothridge, An Evaluation of 42
Accelerant Detection Canine Teams, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 561 (1995).
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in the pyrolysis products of ordinary household items that are released into the
atmosphere when these items burn. 96 Of special concern are the pyrolysis
products created and released by burned plastics, bedding, upholstered furniture,
carpet, and carpet padding,97 the chemical compounds commonly present in a
house fire.
In other words, a well-trained ADC's highly sensitive nose can and does
lead to a high level of accuracy in finding and alerting to specific ignitable liquids
when they arepresent. But, an ADC's lack of discrimination commonly leads to
false positives-that mimic, to the dog, an ignitable liquid-where the ADC
contained in pyrolysis products even when no
alerts to chemical compounds
98
ignitable liquid is present.
It is because of ADCs' concerning level of false positives (again, not as
a result of their lack of sensitivity to chemicals, but rather due to their lack of
discrimination or selectivity between chemicals) that every fire investigation and
canine professional association involved in the training or use of ADCs demands
laboratory verification of fire debris samples.
In 1994, IAAI released a position paper on the value of unconfirmed
ADC alerts. While recognizing the efficiency of using well-trained ADCs to
identify areas where the presence of an ignitable liquid is suspected, the position
paper makes it clear that an unconfirmed ADC alert lacks the reliability
99
necessary for an ADC alert to be of any value in a courtroom.
This position was ratified by the National Fire Protection Association
and added to NFPA 921 through an emergency amendment in 1996. This
amendment specifically advised, "In order for the presence or absence of an
ignitable liquid to be scientifically confirmed in a sample, that sample should be
analyzed by a laboratory. Any canine alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis
should not be considered validated." 10 0 Unfortunately, to this day, dog handler
testimony regarding unconfirmed alerts of ADCs have often been admitted in
10 1
court as evidence of the presence of an ignitable liquid.
See generally Sheryl M. Katz & Charles R. Midkiff, Unconfirmed Canine Accelerant
96
Detection: A Reliability Issue in Court,43 J. FORENSIC Sci. 329 (1998).
97
See generally, Michael E. Kurz et al., Effect of Background Interference on Accelerant
Detection Canines,41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 868 (1996).
98
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 178 ("Research has shown that canines have responded or have
been alerted to pyrolysis products that are not produced by an ignitable liquid and have not always
responded when an ignitable liquid accelerant was known to be present.").
99
Lentini, supra note 2, at 14; see also Carl Chasteen et al., IAAJ Forensic Science
Commission Position on the Use of Accelerant Detection Canine, 40 J. FORENSIC Sci. 532, 533
(1995).
100 NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 178; see also JOHN D. DEHAAN, KIRK'S FIRE INVESTIGATION

543 (6th ed. 2007).
101 For a detailed discussion of the admissibility of unconfirmed ADC alert testimony, see
generally United States v. Hildenbrandt, 207 F. App'x 50 (2d. Cir. 2006); Goldstein v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 95 Civ. 8783, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18288 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
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In a 2012 position statement, the Canine Accelerant Detection
Association ("CADA"), the oldest and largest national professional organization
involved in the training, handling, and use of ADCs in the United States, went
further: "[O]ur position is that no Prosecutor, Attorney or ADC Handler should
ever testify or encourage testimony that an ignitable liquid is present without
10 2
confirmation through laboratory analysis."
The information provided by an ACD may help direct an investigative
strategy and may save the examiner valuable time in narrowing down areas to
examine more closely. However, a dog alert is not, in the absence of confirming
laboratory analysis, evidence of the presence of an ignitable liquid. It is at best a
presumptive test requiring independent, objective, and scientific corroboration.
III.

THE DANGER OF MIXING FORENSIC AND CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATORY ROLES

The police officer was the first on the scene and approached the trailer
from the backyard. 10 3 He could see the orange glow of flames in the bedroom
window and smoke pumping out from the eaves of the roof above it.
Running around to the front of the trailer, he looked through the open
front door. The smoke in the living room was still light, and he could see across
the room to the fire burning in the bedroom. He walked across the front threshold
and stood next to the couch a few feet inside the doorway. As the fire grew in the
bedroom, smoke was getting thicker and hotter along the ceiling where he stood.
When flames began to roll out along the top of the bedroom doorway
towards the living room where he stood, the officer backed out the same way he
came in. He watched through the front door as the fire began to engulf the living
room and kitchen. As smoke and flames rolled out the front doorway he had

v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512 (Ark. 2000); Reisch v. State, No. 426, 1992, 1993 Del. LEXIS 229 (Del.
June 4, 1993); Cart v. State, 482 S.E.2d 314, 318 (Ga. 1997); People v. Acri, 662 N.E.2d 115, 117
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Yell v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 331 (Ky. 2007); State ex rel. EK., 766
So. 2d 661 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Crouse, 855 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 2006); People
v. Jackson, No. 272776, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 958 (Mich. Ct. App. May 13, 2008); State v.
Sharp, 928 A.2d 165, 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2006); Maier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 838 N.Y.S.2d 715
(App. Div. 2007); People v. Dix, 662 N.Y.S.2d 879 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Abner, No. 20661,
2006 WL 2522384 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); State v. Webber, 716 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1998); Fitts v. State,
982 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App. 1998); State v. Schoulz, 58 P.3d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); Bruce L.
Ottley, Beyond the Crime Laboratory: The Admissibility of Unconfirmed Forensic Evidence in
Arson Cases, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIME & CIV. CONFINEMENT 263 (2010) ("Several courts have
admitted the testimony (usually offered in the form of expert testimony), or indicated that they
would admit it, if the proper foundation were established.").
102

CADA's Position on "Testifying to Negative Samples, " CANINE ACCELERANT DETECTION

ASS'N
[hereinafter
CADA 's
Position],
http://nebula.wsimg.com/5cl6de81 3c273d37d880d6464cd9b29a?AccessKeyld=8AE85CC0449F
8A1 178AF&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
103
Yell v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 331 (Ky. 2007).
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exited just moments before, he radioed the police dispatcher and reported the
trailer was now "fully involved."
The state fire marshal investigator arrived a few hours later. One of the
first things he noticed was the deep, low burning on the floors of the living room,
kitchen, and bedroom. Using a shovel to dig away the fire debris in each location,
he found areas in each room where the fire had burned holes through the floor.
The investigator knew of only one thing that would cause a hole to be burned
through a floor-a liquid accelerant, like gasoline, being poured and ignited.
Soon the state fire marshal arrived to assist in the investigation. He
examined the same holes and drew the same conclusions: holes burned through
the floor were clear evidence of an ignitable liquid; three holes, each in different
rooms, were clear evidence of arson. Wanting confirmation, they called for the
arson dog.
The dog handler was also a fire investigator. He knew the meaning of
low burning and holes burned through a floor. When he and his dog first
examined the trailer, with the dog on a long lead, the dog showed no interest.
Things changed once the dog was put on a short leash and directed to each of the
suspicious areas. The dog eventually alerted near each of the holes.
Despite the police officer's eye-witness account of a bedroom fire
growing to engulf the living room and kitchen, each fire investigator was
convinced that this fire was the result of an ignitable liquid poured in multiple
locations and intentionally lit. This fire was arson, and they knew who did it.
When laboratory testing of fire debris from each location where the dog
alerted was negative for ignitable liquids, their confidence was not shaken. The
fire investigators knew what caused those holes, and the dog handler knew that
his dog was better than the laboratory. He had been taught throughout his training
to "trust your dog," and that is exactly what he did.
Any forensic domain with methodologies as lacking in scientific rigor as
the ones described in this Article is bound to produce questionable results, as the
case above illustrates. But fire investigation is susceptible to a potentially even
more pernicious danger, namely the mixing of forensic examination and criminal
investigation where the role of the fire investigator goes beyond determining
where and how a fire started to trying to prove who started it and why. For all of
these reasons discussed in this Article, determining precisely where a fire started
and what caused it can be a difficult (and sometimes impossible) task, yet an
arson investigator's ability to sift through the debris of a fire to determine where
and how the fire began is almost folkloric. Part of that folklore revolves around
the imagery and romance of the arson investigator himself-equal parts cop,
forensic scientist, detective, and general sleuth.
Many of the problems discussed in this Article are a reflection of this
unique and concerning mixing of forensic examination with criminal
investigation: the mixing of fire investigation with arson investigation. In the
simplest terms, fire investigation is a forensic discipline while arson
investigation is not.
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Like any forensic discipline, fire investigation involves the application
of scientific, engineering, and technical principles to the examination of physical
and empirical evidence. For the fire investigator, that physical evidence is the
fire scene itself and all of the items contained in it.
The purpose of a forensic fire investigation is to determine the origin,
cause, and development of the fire,10 4 not who started it or why.10 5 Because the
fire investigator's conclusions are based on education, experience, and the
application of scientific methodologies (in other words, analysis not available to
a jury member), the opinions derived from that examination and analysis are
10 6
often the subject of expert testimony.
Arson investigation, on the other hand, is a subset of criminal
investigation where the investigator considers the totality of the circumstances
(including, perhaps, the conclusions of forensic experts) to understand if a crime
took place and, if it did, to gather evidence to prove each element, understand
possible motives, and identify a criminal suspect. Although criminal
investigators routinely testify to their observations, the opinions of the criminal
investigator are generally not admissible as evidence as they do not involve a
form of analysis that the jury cannot do for itself.10 7
A.

Fire Investigators Should Not Testify to the Ultimate Issue of Criminal

Culpability
Because the examination, interpretation, and analysis by the fire
investigator is based on a level of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education in applying the processes and methodologies of fire investigation-a
knowledge and experience level not available to the average jury member-the
conclusions of the fire investigator regarding the origin, cause, and development
of a fire or explosion clearly fall within the scope of expert testimony.108
Whereas the expert's testimony regarding the origin, cause, and
development of a fire is clearly the subject of expert testimony, the classification

104

NFPA, supra note 7, at 15.

105

See NAS REPORT, supra note 57, at 23 ("[F]orensic investigations should be independent of

law enforcement efforts either to prosecute criminal suspects or even to determine whether a
criminal act has indeed been committed.").
106
FED R. EvI. 702 (allowing a jury to hear expert testimony when the expert's opinions are

based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will help the [jury] to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." In order to qualify under Rule 702, the
expert's testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and those methods must
have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.).
107
FED. R. EVID. 701 (allowing testimony from a lay witness in the form of an opinion when it
is: "(a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702").
108
See NPFA 921, supra note 7.
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of that cause (whether or not the fire was intentionally lit) is not because such
classification requires an analysis of whether the ignition sequence was
intentional or accidental. This conclusion goes beyond where and how the fire
began and turns to the intentional or accidental nature of an incident.
Nevertheless, the fire investigator is often asked to categorize the incident into
one of four classifications: natural, incendiary, accidental, or undetermined.10 9
NFPA 921 defines an incendiary fire as "a fire that is deliberately set
11
intent to cause a fire to occur in an area where the fire should not be;"
the
with
whereas an accidental fire is one where "the proven cause does not involve an
intentional human act to ignite or spread [the] fire."11 A fire is correctly classified
as undetermined "when the intent of the person's action cannot be determined or
'
proven to an acceptable level of certainty."112
NFPA 921 draws no distinction between the scientific or technical nature
of determining a fire's origin and cause (the basis of an expert opinion)1 13 with
the circumstantial nature of inferring human intent or lack thereof when
classifying a fire as incendiary or accidental. As a result, fire investigators are
routinely called upon to testify to the classification of a fire's cause with the
as if that classification were the product of
authority of an expert witness,
14
forensic expert analysis.'
Imagine for a moment that we were discussing a different forensic
domain: A fingerprint analyst is asked to provide expert testimony as to her
conclusions after comparing an unknown, latent print from the trigger of a pistol
to the known, rolled print of a criminal defendant. The expert testifies that based
on her examination of both prints, she has found sufficient similarity to conclude,
with the certainty appropriate to the domain, that they both came from the same
individual-that they are a match. The examiner's qualifications and the
reliability of the methodologies employed notwithstanding, this is a simple
example of expert testimony well within the confines of fingerprint comparison
and allowable under Daubert.
Now imagine the next question asked of the fingerprint examiner is this:
"Knowing now that the fingerprint found on the pistol is that of the defendant,
what was the defendant's state of mind when he touched his finger to the
trigger?" Or put differently, "Did the defendant touch the trigger intentionally or
accidentally?"
109

Id. at 204.

11o Id.
III

Id.

112

Id.

113

See generally id.

114

See generally BRIAN HENRY & ANDREW

SMITH, FITTING A SQUARE PEG INTO A ROUND HOLE

(2016),
921
NFPA
https://www.dropbox.com/s/pwrlp7czj615jeb/ISFI2016Proceedings-FittingaSquarePegBHenry
.pdfdl=0.
-FIRE

CLASSIFICATION

UNDER
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As outrageous as this line of questioning appears, it is precisely what
occurs every time a fire investigator is asked to testify to the intentional or
accidental nature of a fire. But whereas a fingerprint examiner would quickly
recognize that questions of intent fall outside of the subject matter of her domain
and go well beyond her expertise as a forensic practitioner, fire investigators,
asked to testify to a defendant's intent, generally do not. As a result, fire
investigators routinely testify with conviction and authority to their interpretation
of a suspect's mental state.
The difference between an accidental and incendiary fire is entirely the
difference between the deliberation or intent of a "human act." For a fire
investigator to testify in this manner is to usurp the role of the jury and to exceed
the limits of the forensic domain of fire investigation-yet this is the type of
testimony that is elicited and accepted by courts across the country on a regular
basis.115
B. Cognitive Bias at Work
In a perfect world, the expert conclusions of a forensic practitioner
would be formed in a vacuum-absent any outside influence, a neutral observer
examining all of the relevant data, using well-calibrated instruments and
confirmed techniques, leading to reliable and accurate conclusions. Fire-scene
investigations are never conducted in such a world.
The reality of fire investigation involves the application of subjective
methodologies at fire-scenes flooded with emotionally charged, often irrelevant,
and potentially biasing information; evidence is considered and analyzed by an
investigator who, at best, is caught in the cross-fire of an adversarial system, and,
at worst, is a partisan player going to work to draw a predefined conclusion.
The core factors that promote exaggerated and misleading testimony by
forensic experts are well known: a subjective process, exposure to irrelevant but
potentially biasing information, and a lack of genuine independence from law
enforcement. These are exactly the issues confronted by fire investigators and
nearly every fire-scene.
Expert conclusions influenced by bias, whether in fire investigation or
another forensic field, should not be confused with an intentional desire on the
part of the expert to proffer false testimony. On the contrary, the victim of bias
is often unaware of its influence. This creates a situation where the expert witness
providing unreliable testimony is harboring a false certainty regarding the
accuracy of her conclusions.
115
See Order Excluding Expert Testimony at 4, State v. Edwards, Case No. 27-CR-15-6336
(Minn. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2016), where the court grants the defense motion to exclude the state's
fire investigator expert testimony regarding his classification of the cause of the fire as "incendiary"
and opinions regarding human intervention needed to start the fire, as this testimony would not

assist the trier of fact and lacked foundational reliability. See also HENRY & SMITH, supranote 114,
at 10.
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This type of expert testimony, which is sincere but nevertheless
incorrect, can be especially dangerous. In The Vision in "Blind"Justice: Expert
Perception,Judgment, and Visual Cognition in ForensicPatternRecognition,116
Dror and Cole point out three special concerns regarding the influence of biasbased expert testimony:
(1) Cognitive biases affect all examiners [in any forensic
discipline]. (2) Erroneous judgments of forensic experts are all
the more persuasive in the legal context because the examiners
believe them themselves .... (3) Many individual examinersand more worrisome, many forensic professional bodies (both
in the U.S and in Europe)-have been reluctant and resistant to
acknowledge, accept, and take proper action to counter these
biases."' 17
1. Role Bias and Conformity Effect
Research has shown that adopting a specific role can impact an
observer's perspective and that it has a direct impact on what information a
person seeks and how that information is perceived and processed. In a study
where one group of participants assumed the role of a home buyer and another
group assumed the role of a burglar, the observations made by the groups starkly
differed depending on the role the participant adopted."18
When a forensic examiner begins to embrace the role of a criminal
investigator, the bias created from that change in perspective can shape his
observations, analysis, and conclusions. The NAS Report strongly recommends
that "forensic investigations should be independent of law enforcement efforts
either to prosecute criminal suspects or even to determine whether a criminal act
has indeed been committed."'" 19
The potential for a forensic examiner to reach bias-based conclusions
when interacting closely with criminal investigators is enormous. In addition to
adopting the perspective of a criminal investigator, a close alliance with law
enforcement can alter the type of information to which a forensic examiner is
exposed.
The effects of role bias can be compounded when there is pressure on
the examiner to be in conformity with other investigators or examiners or when

116 Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision in "Blind" Justice:Expert Perception,Judgment,
and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REv. 161

(2010).
117

Id. at 162.

118

James W. Pichert & Richard C. Anderson, Taking Different Perspectiveson a Story, 69 J.

EDUC. PSYCHOL. 309 (1977), reprinted in UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, CTR. FOR STUDY
OF READING 9-11 (2007).
119

See NAS

REPORT,

supra note 57, at 23.
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one examiner relies on the views of others in order to develop what should be an
independent conclusion.
Fire investigators can be especially at risk of assuming the role of a
criminal investigator-in many jurisdictions this policy is officially endorsed. In
place of the independence of forensic examination recommended in the NAS
Report, many public agencies have adopted the Arson Task Force model where
fire department investigators are teamed up with investigators from the police
and district attorney's office, sharing responsibilities for the criminal
investigation, where the lines between fire scene examiner and criminal
investigator are not just blurred but are obliterated.
NFPA 921 does little to separate the two vocations. In the chapter titled
"Incendiary Fires," NPFA 921 provides a list of indicators that an investigator
may use in drawing a conclusion that the fire has been deliberately ignited under
circumstances in which the person knows the fire should not be ignited. 120 In
addition to physical evidence relating to the origin and cause of the fire that may
be found at the fire scene (incendiary devices, delay devices, indications of
multiple fires, etc.), the chapter contains a list of non-fire indicators under the
heading, "Potential Indicators Not Directly Related to Combustion." These
factors (removal or replacement of contents, absence of personal items prior to
the fire, evidence of other crimes, indications of financial stress, over-insurance,
owners with fires at other properties, etc.) fall outside an origin and cause
investigator's area of expertise but are well within a criminal investigator's
responsibility. In this way, NFPA 921 seems to encourage the fire scene
examiner to consider information that may be helpful in proving the elements of
a crime but are entirely irrelevant to the determination of a fire's origin or cause.
In no other forensic discipline is the forensic examiner expected to
determine if a crime has or has not occurred, or to examine evidence outside the
examiner's area of expertise in order to identify a suspect, verify a suspect's
opportunity to commit the crime, or develop a motive. Only fire investigation,
particularly as practiced in the public sector, has embraced the merger of forensic
examiner with criminal investigator, seemingly unaware of the pitfalls this
potential bias creates.
2. Expectation and Confirmation Bias
Expectation bias is the tendency for experimenters to believe, certify,
and express data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an
experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding
weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.12 1 In other
words, the observer's conclusions are contaminated with a pre-existing

120

See NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 237.

121

Id. at 20; Monwhea Jeng, A Selected History ofExpectation Bias in Physics, 74 AM. J. PHYS.

578, 581-82 (2006).
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expectation and perception, reducing the observer's objectivity, and laying the
groundwork for selective attention to evidence. 122 In fire origin and cause
investigation, as in other forensic disciplines, expectation bias is caused by the
examiner harboring an expectation prior to examining the evidence. The key
ingredient of expectation bias is exposure to information that is domainirrelevant.As the name implies, domain-irrelevantinformation is data that may
be relevant to the wider criminal investigation, which would include identifying
a suspect, establishing a motive, and determining if a crime has even occurred.
Such information, however, is not relevant to the forensic examination at handnamely, determining the origin and cause of the fire.
A closely related phenomenon is confirmation bias, which is the
tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that confirms the
observer's preconceptions. 123 The hallmark of confirmation bias is the effort to
bolster a hypothesis by seeking out evidence that supports the preconception,
while dismissing contradictory evidence.
An important implication of expectation and confirmation bias is the
influence it plays on the amount of information or evidence necessary to reach
the minimum threshold needed to form a conclusion. In the presence of a preformed expectation, observers tend to require
less evidence to support a
24
conclusion consistent with their expectation. 1
Cases and research involving fingerprint analysis provide particularly
clear examples of the impact of expectation bias in forensic examinations.
Fingerprint analysis, like fire pattern analysis, lacks clear instrumental
measurement. In both types of examinations, the measuring instrument, in large
part, is the examiner performing the analysis. 125 Reliance on human perception
and interpretation of images and patterns, whether they be fingerprints, bite
marks, tool marks, handwriting, or fire patterns, is both common and concerning
because expectation bias is most potent where the underlying analysis is
subjective, ambiguous, or ill-defined.
The erroneous fingerprint identification of Brandon Mayfield and the
follow-up research based on his case exposed the effects of expectation bias and

122

For more information on expectation and perception, see

ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITION AND

REALITY: PRINCIPLES AND IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

(Richard C. Atkinson et al.

eds., 1976).
123

MARGARET E. OSWALD & STEFAN GROSJEAN, ConfirmationBias, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS:

A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY 79-96 (2004);
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 20.
124
For more information on decision thresholds, see Victoria L. Phillips, Michael J. Saks &
Joseph L. Peterson, The Application of Signal Detection Theory to Decision-Making in Forensic
Science, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 294, 296 (2001).
125

SIMON

A. COLE,

SUSPECT IDENTITIES

203-05 (2001); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber,

Scientific Validation of FingerprintEvidence Under Daubert,7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 87 (2008);
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a
FingerprintingModerate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).
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the use of selective re-examination. 126 Brandon Mayfield was an Oregon attorney
arrested by the FBI and held as a material witness in the Madrid terrorist bombing
case in 2004. His arrest was based on a misidentified partial fingerprint found at
the crime scene in Madrid. The FBI fingerprint examiner's conclusions were
confirmed by at least two additional FBI examiners, as well as a fingerprint
examiner hired by the defense. Two weeks after Mayfield's arrest, the Spanish
National Police matched the fingerprint to an Algerian, Ouhnane Daoud.
Mayfield was released, and the FBI made a rare public apology and provided a
$2,000,000 settlement.
In 2006, the Mayfield case was used in a dynamic research study 1to
27
measure the influence of expectation bias in the field of fingerprint analysis.
Five experienced latent print examiners were given a pair of prints which they
were told were Mayfield's fingerprint and the latent print from the Madrid
bombing crime scene. None of the fingerprint examiners had ever seen these
prints, but all were aware of the well-publicized case. In this way, the five
participants were provided with strong contextual clues that the prints, although
visually similar, were not a match.
In fact, the examiners were each given a set of prints that they had, years
earlier in real criminal cases, concluded were matches. Each examiner had before
them two fingerprints that they had previously determined to have come from
the same source; however, the expectation in the minds of the examiners was that
the fingerprints, although very similar, were not a match.
The fingerprint examiners were asked to compare the prints and to ignore
any additional contextual information (particularly, that the prints were from the
Mayfield case and known not to be a match). Four of the five examiners
contradicted their original conclusions; three changed their conclusions from
"identification" to "exclusion" and one changed from "identification" to
"inconclusive." Only one examiner maintained his original conclusion that the
two prints came from the same individual.
A follow-up study using 48 pairs of fingerprints showed that expectation
bias fostered by information such as "the suspect confessed to the crime" or "the
suspect has an alibi" could influence examiners' conclusions in both directions,
(concluding that the two
towards "individualization" (a match) or "exclusion"
1 28
prints did not come from the same source).
In a fingerprint comparison, the only domain-relevant information is the
actual fingerprint images being compared; the conclusions of the examiners
should be based on that information alone. Additional contextual information,
such as "the suspect confessed to the crime" or "the suspect has an alibi," is

126

See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE

MAYFIELD CASE (2006) (investigating the "misidentification, investigation, and
detention of Mayfield").
See Dror & Cole, supra note 116, at 162.
127

BRANDON

128

Id. at 165.
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outside the domain of the fingerprint examiner. Although important factors in
the overall criminal investigation, this information is domain-irrelevant to the
forensic examiner. The same can be said for fire investigation; the conclusions
of the fire investigator should be based on the physical and empirical evidence
at the fire scene, not the highly-charged and potentially biasing information
involved in proving the crime of arson.
This is not to say that the expectation itself is not necessarily valid or
reasonable. On the contrary, a perfectly valid and well-reasoned expectation can
create the bias and be equally harmful. However, the role of the fire investigator,
as a forensic examiner, is to draw expert conclusions within his discipline based
solely on reliable, domain-relevant information.
Once a fire investigator has drawn an investigative conclusion-such as
where a fire started (its area of origin) or under what circumstance it was ignited
(arson or accident)-it is very easy, intentionally or not, to exploit the vague and
imprecise nature of fire-scene examination to make observations that support the
conclusion and equally easy to dismiss evidence to the contrary.
In research designed to measure the impact of confirmation bias in the
field of criminal investigation, Barbara O'Brien and Phoebe Ellsworth asked
participants to review and evaluate a file from a criminal case., 29 A portion of
the group was asked to develop a hypothesis as to the suspect early in the case
review while the other participants were not asked to specify a suspect. The study
showed that the simple act of naming a suspect early in the case review process
tended to develop a bias in the minds of the participants, which caused them to
search for evidence thought to inculpate their named suspect, while tending to
ignore or downplay equally exculpatory evidence.13 ° Moreover, participants who
named a suspect tended to interpret ambiguous evidence in a manner consistent
with their earlier conclusion.1 3 1 And if the pre-formed conclusion is sufficiently
embedded in the mind of the examiner, even clear and precise scientific analysis
may be insufficient to dislodge it.
When forensic anthropologists were asked to evaluate a set of skeletal
remains in order to evaluate the sex, ethnic ancestry, and approximate age at time
of death, the influence of outside information became clear. In the absence of
extraneous information, using only the techniques of their forensic domain, 69%
of the control group opined the skeletal remains were those of a female (31%
determined male; 0% undetermined). One-hundred percent of the same control
group determined the remains were those of a Caucasian.

See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Barbara O'Brien, ConfirmationBias in CriminalInvestigations,
CORNELL U. (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.comell.edu/video/confirmation-bias-in-criminal129

investigations.
130

Id.

131

Id.
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What is clear from the conclusions of the control group is that for this
particular set of skeletal remains, gender determination was more subjective and
ambiguous than the determination of racial ancestry.
When the first of two treatment groups were told prior to their
examination that DNA testing had already determined the skeleton was that an
Asian female, the ambiguity surrounding gender identification evaporated. One
hundred percent of the first treatment group were able to confirm the DNA
analysis: the skeleton-in the eyes of the treatment group-was clearly a female.
But subjectivity cuts both ways. While a belief that DNA testing had
already determined the skeleton was from a female pushed examiners towards a
confirming conclusion consistent with that expectation, a belief that DNA had
confirmed the skeleton was from a male did the same thing but in the opposite
direction. Only 29% of the second treatment group-who were told that DNA
had determined the skeleton to be of a male-concluded the skeleton was female
while 71% determined it was a male.
Even the more straightforward determination of racial identity became
hijacked when the treatment groups were given contextual information before
the examination took place. The treatment group that was told the remains were
from a Caucasian completely agreed: 100% of the second treatment group, like
the control group, concluded the skeleton was that of a Caucasian. However,
when the other treatment group was told the skeleton was of an Asian, the power
of expectation bias took over: the conclusion that the skeleton was Caucasian
dropped from 100% to 50%.

Male
Female
Caucasian
Asian

Control
Group

Treatment Group 1:
Female-Asian Context

31%
69%
100%
0%

0%
100%
50%
29% (21% undetermined)

Treatment Group 2:
Male-Caucasian
Context
71%
29%
100%
0%

The influence of domain-irrelevant and expectation inducing
information is not limited to the examination of fingerprints or skeletal
remains."2 Research has shown that under the right circumstances, even1 the
33
strong scientific underpinnings of DNA analysis can take a backseat to bias.
Even though fire scene examinations pose special risks of exposing the
investigator to potentially biasing information, the fire investigation community
is largely unaware of its impact. Current fire investigation training curricula give

132

Jose Kerstholt et al., Does Suggestive Information Cause a Confirmation Bias in Bullet

Comparisons?, 198 FORENSIC SCI INT'L 138 (2010).
133
Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture
Interpretation,51 ScI. & JUST. 204 (2011).
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short shrift to the subject of cognitive bias or its consequences. Although NFPA
921 mentions both expectation and confirmation bias and warns the investigator
to avoid presumption, nothing is said to assist the investigator in recognizing
the
34
factors that contribute to the bias or the safeguards designed to prevent it. 1
3. Selective Re-examination Bias
Perhaps the most elusive bias commonly found in forensic science is the
use of selective re-examination to confirm a hypothesis or a conclusion, where
the second, independent examination is conducted by an examiner who is (1)
aware of the conclusion drawn by the original examiner, (2) often made aware
of the same domain-irrelevant information that tended to bias the original
examination in the first place, and (3) is on the receiving end of a direct or
indirect implication as to the conclusion(s) he is expected to reach.
The use of selective re-examination, and the potential biases which it
infers, is common in the field of fire investigation, where the secondary examiner
is routinely told the conclusions of the first examination-where the fire is
believed to have begun and the circumstances behind it-before the second,
separate examination is conducted.
To find a clear example of selective re-examination combining with
expectation and confirmation bias at a fire scene, we do not have to look beyond
a dog handler testifying to an alert of an ADC.
ADC handlers and their dogs are often called to fire scenes to confirm
the presence of an ignitable liquid that may have been used to accelerate the
development of a fire. Often, the dog handler is given information about what is
known, or thought to be known, about the case that has nothing to do with the
search for an ignitable liquid.
In one Wisconsin case, 135 before examining the scene with his ADC, the
dog handler "learned that three children had died, and that a woman who had
been 17 weeks pregnant was in intensive care but not expected to live, but who
also had lost her unborn fetus due to the injuries sustained., 136 The handler was
"advised they believed that the fire was started with an accelerant (gasoline) by
the suspect [sic] in custody statements. 137 So before entering the building with
his dog, the handler already knew the magnitude of the case (multiple deaths and
injuries), that a suspect had been arrested, and that the suspect had confessed to
using gasoline.
With that expectation firmly planted in the mind of the dog handler, the
results were not surprising. The dog allegedly alerted to multiple locations
NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 20.
See Criminal Complaint, Wisconsin v. Wand (Wis. Cir. Ct. Sept. 11, 2012) (Nos. 12-CF074, 12-CF-075); Country Club Hills Police Report, Incident # 12-04962 (on file with authors).
136 Id.
137
Id.
134

135
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throughout the building. While searching a badly burned bedroom, the dog
handler recognized what he evaluated as suspicious fire patterns and determined
that there "[a]ppearedto have a secondaryfire originswith what appearedto be
'pour patterns' on the floor at the foot of a ... bed." The canine alerted to the
bed in the area of the "pourpatterns," confirming the handler's suspicions.
All of the samples taken from the fire scene and sent to the crime lab
came back negative for presence of ignitable liquid. The negative lab results raise
some disturbing questions: Were the unconfirmed alerts of the ADC the result of
the dog's nose being more sensitive than the lab or just another example of the
significant rate of false-positive alerts of ADCs searching a fire scene?
Moreover, did the pre-formed expectations of the dog handler have any influence
on the dog's behavior or on the handler's interpretation of the dog's behavior? A
recent research study suggests it did.
In 2009, three researchers from the University of California at Davis
designed a study to measure the influence of a dog handler's beliefs on the
accuracy and reliability of dog scent alerts.13 8 For their study, four rooms were
used: one room had a piece of red construction paper on the outside of a cabinet,
one room had a hidden decoy (piece of food and tennis ball), another room had
the same hidden decoy with its location marked by a piece of red construction
paper, and the final room had neither a hidden decoy nor red construction
paper. 139 Eighteen dog handlers were told that the two rooms marked by a piece
of red construction paper contained hidden target scent 0 (participating canines
were trained on explosives material, narcotics, or both).14
In truth, none of the rooms contained any target materials. As a result,
any handler-reported dog alert to any location was a false-positive.
The study found that handlers reported alerts in all four rooms, with
significantly more alerts reported at the locations marked by red construction
paper. 41 The conclusions of the researchers were that the beliefs of the dog
handlers had a significant impact on alert locations reported by handlers, and
whatever the underlying sensitivity of the scent detection canines, a pre-formed
belief on the part of the handler as to the location of the target material(s) tended
alerts by increasing the rate of falseto undermine the reliability of the dogs'
14 2
positive alerts as reported by handlers.

138

See Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL

COGNITION 387, 387 (2011).
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Id. at 389.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 390-91.
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IV. INNOCENCE CLAIMS DURING POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES

Just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, conclusions in

forensic science are only as valuable-and reliable-as its weakest process. In
the field of fire investigation, where final conclusions are built upon several
underlying key sub-conclusions, the expert opinions of a fire investigator as to
where or how a fire began are only as strong as the sub-conclusions that support
them. In a forensic discipline with no internal mechanism to limit the conditions
under which its core methodologies are applied, where an unverified statement
of a witness can be translated by the investigator into a final conclusion, where
opinions are often based on a complete lack of physical evidence, and where the
investigator is routinely called upon to testify to matters entirely outside his or
her expertise, it comes as no surprise that fire investigation remains an outlier
among more highly regarded domains of forensic science.
Perhaps the only factor more concerning than its lack of scientific
underpinning and entirely unknown error rates is the routine and consistent
exposure to domain-irrelevant and potentially biasing information that has
become a standard part of modem fire investigation. If the research in this area
has taught us anything it is that the easiest way to corrupt a forensic science
examination is to simply tell the examiner the answer before he or she is asked
the question. Whether it is forensic anthropology, fingerprint comparison, or fire
investigation, nothing hijacks the process more quickly than the examiner
believing he knows the outcome before examining the evidence.
In the simultaneous and conflated process of fire and arson investigation,
where the same investigator identifies a suspect, establishes an origin,
investigates a motive, and determines a cause, it is an undeniable street-level
reality that fire investigators often think they know the answers to these questions
before he ever steps foot on the fire scene.
It is equally undeniable that, given its lack of scientific underpinning and
routine biasing information, modem fire investigation poses a unique and
substantial risk of increasing convictions of innocent individuals. As we discuss
below, the risk of incarcerating innocent individuals is magnified when a
criminal judicial system favors comity and finality to the point it is virtually
impossible for defendants to obtain relief from their convictions-even when
their convictions were based on investigative methods below rudimentary
scientific standards.
A.

The Relative Weightlessness ofInnocence on DirectAppeal, in Habeas
Proceedings,and in Innocence ProtectionLitigation

Inertia is built into the criminal justice system quite deliberately. Indeed,
notions of comity and finality-that jurisdictions will recognize the validity and
effect of judicial decisions, and that legal proceedings must come to an end-create a systemic intransigence that perpetuates an equity error-first made
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during trial proceedings-through post-conviction remedy proceedings.143 These
concepts may have been necessary when the only evidence available was
eyewitness testimony (which grows less accurate and more dim over time), but
should arguably carry less weight now that "[a] rapid escalation in the quality
and quantity of scientific evidence, including new tools and modes of analysis,
has meant that for the first time in history some forms of evidence can become
more reliable with time.' 4 4
The inertia of the criminal justice system dictates that, through every
process of review after a conviction, the facts will be viewed in the light most
favorable to the government, 145 that any trial errors must overcome the
presumption of harmlessness, 146 that any constitutional errors will require a
showing of prejudice, 147 and that anyone claiming innocence has a heavy burden
of proof. 48 In short, our system amounts to one in which zero weight is given to
defense evidence at appeal, plus zero opportunity for discovery, zero
consideration of how errors would have affected the jury, and zero credit for any
but the most compelling of new evidence equals, for most individuals
49
challenging their convictions, zero relief.1
As we show below, the process of direct appeal is ill-equipped to deal
with new evidence or claims of innocence, leaving essentially two potential
150
mechanisms for litigating innocence claims: writs of habeas corpus in state

143
See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REv.
591, 602 (2009) [hereinafter Findley, Innocence].
144
Robert J. Smith, RecalibratingConstitutionalInnocence Protection,87 WASH. L. REv. 139,

142 (2012).
145

See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 112 (2008).

146

Id. at 107-08.

147

See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel

claims must demonstrate prejudice); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (undisclosed

exculpatory evidence must be material).
148

See Garrett, supra note 145, at 112-13 (45% of innocent defendants raised sufficiency of

evidence claims on appeal, but only one was granted relief; the five in Garrett's study who raised
factual innocence claims on federal habeas all had them denied).
149 See, e.g., id.; Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALA. L. Rev. 1157 (2010)
[hereinafter Findley, Defining]; Findley, Innocence, supra note 143.

150 We will not discuss state habeas because the issues are too varied and complex for the scope
of this Article, and not necessary to the understanding that obtaining habeas relief based on any
kind of innocence claims is difficult and rare. It is worth noting, however, that in theory, obtaining
habeas relief in state court based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence ought to be easier
than obtaining relief in federal court for a state conviction, since issues of federalism-of a federal
court overturning a state conviction on factual issues-are absent. See, e.g., Findley, Defining,
supra note 149, at 1204.
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and federal courts15 1 and state statutes52that grant prisoners a right to seek relief
based on newly discovered evidence. 1
1. The Direct Appeals Process Does Not Catch and Correct Factual
Error
Brandon Garrett analyzed the first 200 DNA exonerations-cases in
which there is no question, based on scientific proof, that the individuals
convicted were innocent of the crime-and noted that only 14% of the cases
resulted in a reversal, despite the fact that 133 of the 200 exoneration cases
produced appellate opinions. 15 3 When capital cases are removed and only noncapital cases with appellate opinions considered, the percentage drops down to
9%.154 These appellate courts did not recognize the innocence of the individuals
who were seeking legal review of their cases; they failed, because of the system's
focus on finality, to correct the ultimate legal error and the ultimate due process
error of convicting an innocent person. We know this because the appellate
courts' reversal rate for cases in which the appellant was innocent is virtually
identical to the reversal rate of criminal appellants generally.1 55 In other words,
being innocent on appeal made no difference. In only 8 of the 133 cases with
written opinions did judges suggest the appellants might be innocent; in contrast,
in 43 of those 133 cases, or 32%, the judges found that there was error, but that
the error was harmless. 156 Even more damning is that the system requires an
appellant to demonstrate that acknowledged errors at trial, such as withheld
of
exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland,157 ineffective assistance 158
harmless.
not
are
experts,
of
exclusion
or
inclusion
inappropriate
and
counsel,
This study found harmless error in 32% of the 133 innocence cases with appellate

151 A state prisoner may seek collateral review from federal courts for violations of the federal
Constitution under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). A federal prisoner may seek collateral review under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
See infra text accompanying notes 160-240.
152
Garrett, supra note 145, at 68.
153
Findley, Innocence, supra note 143, at 594; Garrett, supra note 145, at 61.
154
Findley, Innocence, supra note 143, at 594; Garrett, supra note 145, at 61.
155
Findley, Innocence, supra note 143, at 595-96; Garrett, supra note 145, at 107.
156
157

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

158
See Findley, Defining, supra note 149, at 1196 (The legal doctrine of harmless error holds
that a reviewing court may find legal error at trial, but still uphold the conviction because the error
was "harmless," meaning, it does not warrant a new trial. In short, rather than analyze whether the
complained of error actually contributed to the jury's verdict, "courts broadly search the record by
asking whether independent evidence of guilt taken alone could support the conviction." Professor
Findley astutely points out that the doctrine of harmless error permits cognitive biases that "can
contribute in powerful ways to a conclusion that the defendant was indeed guilty, and that the error
was therefore harmless.").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/6

42

Dehghani-Tafti and Bieber: Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson Investigation and

2016]

FOLKLORE AND FORENSICS

opinions-as compared to only 26% of the matched comparison group of
criminal appellate cases.159
Even constitutional errors as fundamental as those affecting the right to
counsel require a showing that the trial was adversely affected: a defendant
claiming his attorney was ineffective, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, because he failed to investigate an alibi defense or other exculpatory
information must prove that the attorney's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the defendant was prejudiced because there
is a reasonable probability that the result at trial would have been different had
the attorney's performance not fallen below that standard. 160 Eighty-nine percent
of the 200 innocence claims that denied relief on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims were rejected "at least in part upon a finding that the defendant could not
prove prejudice." 161 Meaning, they could not prove that the results of the trial
would probably have been different.
The most direct way to assert innocence on appeal is to claim insufficient
evidence, but it is nearly impossible to obtain a reversal on these grounds because
the evidence is weighed in the light most favorable to the conviction-meaning,
deferential to the facts established by the state at trial. As Keith Findley points
out, "[d]eferential fact review by design makes it difficult for an innocent
defendant to prevail on a claim of innocence on appeal." 162 And worse, this
standard has become even more deferential over time: "Most courts [apply] the
standard so deferentially that . . . they uphold convictions unless there is
essentially no evidence supporting an element of the crime., 1 63 Case in point:
45% of the 200 innocent defendants raised insufficiency of the evidence claims,
164
but only one obtained relief on that basis.
Thus, it is left to courts in collateral proceedings, governors in clemency
requests, and others involved in newly discovered evidence statute proceedings
to correct factual errors and constitutional rights violations that implicate the
fundamental fairness of a trial.1 65

159 Findley, Innocence, supra note 143, at 596; Garrett, supra note 145, at 109.
160
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669-70 (1984).

Findley, Innocence, supra note 143, at 604.
162
Id. at 603.
163
Id. at 602.
164
Id. at 602; Garrett, supra note 145, at 112.
165
We will refer to the statutes which permit introduction of newly discovered evidence in
support of a claim of factual innocence as "innocence protection" (or "actual innocence") statutes
because they are based on newly developed facts and not claims related to the violation of
constitutional rights or trial error. These statutes provide a basis to attack a conviction directly,
rather than collaterally by challenging the fairness of the trial process.
161
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The Habeas Process Is Currently Equally Ineffective in Rooting
Out Factual Errors

State and federal habeas corpus procedures are collateral attacks on
convictions designed to correct constitutional errors, such as the government's
suppression of exculpatory evidence in violation of state and federal due process
rights.
As petitions for writs of habeas corpus seeking federal review of state
166
convictions increased in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts and Congress created
several procedural obstacles for petitioners. The passage of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996, for example, dramatically reduced the
availability of relief through federal review by requiring federal courts to give
deference to state court decisions on the merits and factual findings of a case.
167
Recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Cullen v. Pinholster, further restrict
1 68
In Pinholster,the
a federal court's ability to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Supreme Court held that federal habeas review "is limited to the record that was
1 69
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Pinholsterthus
limits the ability of federal courts to conduct evidentiary hearings for state habeas
petitions sought because "[i]f a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a
state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of §
1 70
In the wake of
2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court.
the Supreme
before
conducted
were
that
Pinholster,even evidentiary hearings
courtstate
in
presented new facts that were not heard
Court decision-and
17
were ignored.

166
167

Smith, supra note 144, at 170.
563 U.S. 170 (2011).

168 Id. at 171, 180-81 (The Court relied on its precedent and looked to the "backward-looking"
language in the statute, which "focuses on what a state court knew and did." Justice Clarence
Thomas, writing for the majority, opined, "[i]t would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze
whether a state court's adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to
facts not before the state court."); see also id. at 184-85 (The Court also explained that its holding
does not make § 2254(e) superfluous because that provision, which limits the discretion of federal
courts in considering new evidence taken at an evidentiary hearing, will still govern when the
federal courts can consider new evidence in connection with claims that were not adjudicated on
the merits in state court.).
169

Id. at 180.

Id. at 184.
171 See, e.g., Williams v. Stanley, 581 F. App'x 295, 296 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding
that because the state court adjudicated petitioner's habeas petition on the merits, petitioner "is not
entitled to adduce evidence to support a claim under § 2254(d)(1)"); Spates v. Clarke, 547 F. App'x
289, 295 n.5 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The district court's sua sponte decision to reach for evidence not
submitted to it or to the last state court that considered the matter... seems at least inconsistent
170

with the spirit of Cullen .... In the end, however, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this

Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 851-52 (4th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e assume that Cullen
");
dispute ....
v. Pinholster precludes our consideration of evidence developed subsequent to the [state
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Evidence of innocence can help to overcome these procedural hurdles
and is the only mechanism around draconian procedural bars. When a petitioner
has procedurally defaulted, meaning, failed to raise a claim to the state or federal
court within the statute of limitations, under federal habeas she or he can use a
claim of innocence as a means to excuse that procedural default and have his or
her underlying claims heard.17 2 A petitioner may seek to demonstrate actual
innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 173 which held that a petitioner demonstrates
actual innocence when "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted ...in the light of the new evidence." 174 In House v. Bell, 175 the
Court held that Mr. House had satisfied this standard when DNA evidence
proved that the semen on the murder victim's nightdress did not belong to House
76
(though there had been some non-scientific evidence that implicated House). 1
While evidence of actual innocence can help a petitioner get through the
procedural quagmire, once those hurdles are scaled, a petitioner must still prove
an underlying constitutional violation, such as described above. 177 Innocence
alone is not enough; a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner in light of the new
evidence.178 Indeed, freestanding innocence claims in federal court for federal
and state prisoners is, currently, only theoretical. 179 In other words, whether or
not imprisonment of an innocent violates the U.S. Constitution absent some
underlying constitutional violation at trial remains an open question: the
Supreme Court has passed on several opportunities to decide whether or not a
standalone innocence claim is cognizable in federal habeas. 180 While analysis of
the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this matter is beyond the scope of this
Article, the direction of the Court's jurisprudence does not impart faith that the
Court will rule on this issue any time soon, or, for that matter, in favor of those
seeking relief. In Herrera v. Collins,1 81 the Supreme Court assumed without
adjudication]."); Jackson v. Kelly, 650 F.3d 477, 480 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district
court's pre-Pinholsterevidentiary hearing under § 2254(d)(1) should now be ignored in light of
the Court's holding in Pinholsterand its review be limited to what is in the state court record).
172
See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995).
173
513 U.S. at 326-27.
Id. at 327.
547 U.S. 518 (2006).
176
Id. at 541. Further analysis of how innocence is relevant to current federal habeas litigation
and how innocence came to play the prominent role it enjoys is beyond the scope of this Article,
though important to the issue of the future of litigating innocence claims.
177
See supra Part IV.A.1.
178 See House, 547 U.S. at 556 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
179 See generally Dist. Atty's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009);
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
180 See generally Osborne, 557 U.S. 52; House, 547 U.S. 518; Herrera,506 U.S. 390.
181
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
174

175
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deciding that "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence"' made after
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant
emphasized that habeas
federal habeas relief, but the majority opinion
82
facts.'
evaluate
to
designed
not
are
proceedings
Even if a freestanding innocence claim were available, the showing
needed would be so exceedingly extraordinary it is difficult to imagine any but
the most clear-cut DNA case-if that-satisfying the standard. Indeed, one court
has described this burden of proof as an impossibly high standard of proof:
By that I do not mean that as a practical matter precious few
applicants will be able to produce new evidence sufficiently
compelling to meet the Herrera majority's test. By that I mean
that it will be impossible by definition for any applicant to meet
of how compelling his newly discovered
the test, regardless
83
evidence.1

This impossible standard is likely due in part to an aversion to second
guessing factual matters determined by the state,184 a core principle of comity."'
But another reason, articulated by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Herrera
concurrence, is that "[o]ur society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal

182 See generally Herrera,506 U.S. at 393; see also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 67-70 (providing a
ray of hope, in that the U.S. Supreme Court assumed something there it had never before assumed:
that a free standing innocence claim might be available even to a non-capital defendant); House,
547 U.S. at 555 (reversing a Sixth Circuit decision denying House review of his constitutional
claims because he did not meet the stringent standard of Schlup; the Court reversed, stating that,
though the Schlup standard is exacting, House's new DNA evidence excluding him from sperm on
the decedent's nightgown (which the prosecution had argued at trial belonged to House, and that
rape was the motive of killing the victim) was so extraordinary that it could be granted review
despite his failure to present the new evidence in state court. While the Court recognized the
evidence as powerful, it declined to discuss the standard for any hypothetical innocence claim
under Herrera, noting that House barely met the Schlup standard-a result that is rather
extraordinary given the prosecution argued and convicted House of murder based on a theory that
whoever killed the victim did so to cover up the crime of rape); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327
(1995) (The Court addressed the actual innocence claim of a death row inmate. Loyd Schlup,
however, had filed a previous habeas petition, and so was precluded procedurally from raising
another petition. The Court permitted his petition to move forward on the basis that newly
discovered evidence can excuse procedural default if, in light of the new evidence, it is "more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." Significantly, the Court did
not hold that claim of innocence provides a basis for relief-only that the Court may hear
procedurally defaulted claims of constitutional violations if a petitioner can provide enough
evidence to pass through the innocence gateway provided in this case.); Brandon L. Garrett, DNA
and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2919 (2010) [hereinafter Garrett, DNA].
183 State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
184 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's deference requirements are
evidence of that aversion. See supra Part IV.A.2.
185 Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, andFederalism, 82 TUL. L. REv. 443,
445 (2007).
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trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers unparalleled protections
against convicting the innocent."'1 86 That was in 1990, when only one individual,
Gary Dodson, had been exonerated by DNA evidence and before hundreds of
exonerations exposed the fault lines of the criminal justice system. Of course, it
goes without saying that, while there are correlations between constitutional
error and innocents being convicted, there is no reason a constitutionally fair trial
would guarantee that an innocent is not convicted.
3. State and Federal Innocence Statutes Have Begun to Turn the Tide,
but Not Completely
In some sense, the tide may have turned since Herrera, at least
rhetorically: the Osborne court gave its strongest hint yet that a stand-alone
innocence claim might be available and might be available to non-capital
petitioners. 187 Retired Justice John Paul Stevens acknowledged the very real risk
of innocents being wrongly convicted and sentenced to death.188 Also retired
Justice O'Connor's view of the death penalty changed, both because of its unfair
administration and because of the growing number of exonerations in the
country. 189 Lastly, virtually all the states and the federal government have, in the
wake of hundreds of exonerations, enacted legislation (or interpreted existing
legislation) that permits an individual convicted of a crime to raise innocence
claims in state courts. 190 Those statutes differ from state to state-with some
states limiting the claims to those based only on biological evidence, 191 some
imposing strict time frames in which an individual may bring a claim of actual
innocence while others permit application at any time, 192 some requiring

186

Herrera,506 U.S. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

187

See Osborne, 557 U.S. at 67-70; Garrett, DNA, supra note 182, at 2951.
Findley, Defining, supra note 149, at 1175.

188

189
See Second Thoughts, TEP, http://www.tep-online.info/laku/usa/dp/doubts2.html. (last
visited Nov. 3, 2016).
190
See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2016) (discussing a dedication to exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals). Arizona
has no specific mechanism to raise claims of innocence through newly discovered evidence, though
they can be raised in a motion for a new trial within 30 days of conviction. Perversely, claims of
newly discovered evidence cannot be raised in post-conviction because the courts have found that
innocence claims are a direct attack on the conviction, and post-conviction under Rule 37 is a
collateral attack on the conviction. See, e.g., Walters v. Iowa, 843 N.W.2d 477 (Iowa Ct. App.
2014). Connecticut has no specific statute, but case law recognizes claims of new evidence as
grounds for innocence in habeas corpus; the burden of proof is extraordinarily high. See Gould &
Taylor v. Comm'r of Corrs., 22 A.3d. 1146 (Conn. 2011) (discussing Miller v. Comm'r of Corr.,
700 A.2d 1108 (Conn. 1997)).
191 See Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62-63.
192
The District of Columbia and Maryland permit applications at any time, and grant discretion

to a court to summarily dismiss second or successive applications. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-
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different levels of proof, as between a preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence,' 93 and some granting different relief based on the level of
proof.194
In broad strokes, most of these statutes require the clear identification of
new evidence; that the new evidence have been unavailable at the time of trial,
even with an exercise of due diligence; that the evidence .goes beyond being
impeaching and is not cumulative; and a verification under oath of the
individual's innocence. 195 Most states require a showing of clear and convincing
evidence of actual innocence for exoneration; 196 some states require a showing
that no reasonable trier of fact would have convicted the petitioner;' 97 others
require a showing-by a substantial probability or significant possibility-that
the result would have been different at trial.1 98 Some states permit consideration
of new evidence only if it is scientific; and only Texas and California explicitly
permit, by statute, vacature of a conviction based on changed scientific
understanding. Some states, like Maryland, have interpreted "new evidence" to
include a change of scientific knowledge that renders the trial in a new light. 2199
01
200
or through case law
Several states, however, restrict through statute

claimants entitled to seek relief even in DNA to defendants who have gone to
4131 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301 (LexisNexis 2016). Some states, like
Virginia, impose a 60 day limit from the time reports of biological testing are published. VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-327.3 (2016). Virginia limits an individual to a single application. VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-327.10 (2016).
193
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4131 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301
(LexisNexis 2016) (Maryland and the District of Columbia are good examples of different levels
of proof providing different relief: proof of innocence by a preponderance of evidence entitles an
individual to a new trial, while proof of innocence by clear and convincing evidence entitles one
to a straightforward vacature of conviction.).
194
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 2016).
195
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4135 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.10 (2016) (non-biological
evidence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 (2016) (enacted in 2001 for biological evidence).
196
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4131 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-301
(LexisNexis 2016).
197
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.13 (2016).
198
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 8-301 (LexisNexis 2016).
199
See generally Ward v. State, 108 A.3d 507 (2015); Lucas v. Maryland, No. 192240032-33
(Md. Cir. 1994) (on file with authors).
200
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.72(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2015) ("An offender is not an eligible
offender under division (C)(1) of this section regarding any offense to which the offender pleaded
guilty or no contest.").
201
See, e.g., Williams v. Erie County District Attorney's Office, 848 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004); Graham v. State, 188 S.W.3d 893 (Ark. 2004); Jamison v. Maryland, No. 6, 2016 WL
6755922 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 15, 2016). Maryland also prohibits the issuance of a writ of
actual innocence in the case of non-biological new evidence when the petitioner entered a guilty
plea or an Alfred plea, which, under Maryland law, is the equivalent of a guilty plea. Yonga v.
Maryland, 130 A.3d 486 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
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trial, and preclude those who have taken guilty pleas or entered Alfred pleas from
being exonerated and even obtaining DNA testing.
B. The Weight of Innocence in Arson Prosecutions
There is no better demonstration of the near insurmountable challenges
individuals face in post-conviction proceedings than in arson post-conviction
proceedings. Essentially, there are two practical ways of litigating postconviction cases involving arson science: First, as a claim of newly discovered
evidence based on scientific development within the framework of innocence
protection statutes, or traditional collateral procedures provided by state and the
federal government, based on claims involving a due process violation; second,
and particularly relevant for cases investigated after widespread acceptance of
the NFPA 921 or cases of expert overreach, a claim in collateral proceedings that
the government presented false or misleading evidence.
1. New Evidence Method
The "new evidence" method can be employed under stand-alone
innocence protection statutes or on collateral appeal, under exceptions to
procedural bars such as statutes of limitations or bars on successive challenges
to a conviction. These challenges involve the argument that the new evidence is
updated research which reveals the "science" used at trial to have been
incorrect-the new evidence is, in other words, the newly discovered or the new
perspective on science, and that, as a result, the petitioner deserves a new trial or
has proven their actual innocence. Several successful cases followed this route,
which was outlined in a groundbreaking article by Caitlin Plummer and Imran
Syed of the University of Michigan Innocence Clinic, 2°2 who represented David
Gavitt in one of the first exonerations based on the new understanding of fire
investigation.
The "new evidence" method has been successful in a variety of contexts.
Seven individuals successfully argued in court that the changed or "shifted"
science was new evidence: Ray Girdler, Jr.,2 °3 Andrew Babick, Kristine

202

See generally Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, "Shifted Science" and Post-Conviction

Relief, 8 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 259 (2012).

Girdler v. Dale, 859 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Ariz. 1994) (explaining that State experts testified in
203
1990 that accelerants were used to set an intentional fire when the evidence could have also been
caused by an accidental fire. The federal district court hearing the habeas petition granted a second
trial in 1994 after experts showed that the evidence used to convict could have been caused by an
accidental fire due to a better understanding of flashover.).
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recently, William Amor.

28

5
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Tonya Lucas, 20 6 Joseph Awe, 20 7 and most

This argument has been persuasive in the context of

204
Michigan v. Babick, No. 1996-2562 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2014) (granting relief in part on the
basis of refined understanding of fire science) (on file with authors); Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d
274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding a claim for merit as well because the government had failed to
produce reports that other claims were denied on the grounds that her defense experts had testified
similarly at trial).
205
Gavitt filed a post-conviction petition seeking a new trial based on the fact that newly
discovered scientific evidence, in the form of a shift in scientific understanding and analysis,
proved that the fire was not arson and all the alleged fire science used at the time of trial (1985,
seven years before the first edition of the NFPA 921) was flawed, from the investigation to the
interpretation of gas chromatography tests. After reviewing the affidavits submitted by Mr. Gavitt
and conducting an independent review of the case, the state agreed that the testimony at trial was
flawed and that the cause and origin of the fire were undetermined; they dismissed the charges
against Mr. Gavitt. See Gavitt v. Born, No. 14-12164, 2015 WL 5013844 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24,
2015); Man Clearedof KillingHis Wife and Two Daughtersin House FireAfter 26 Years in Prison,
DAILY MAIL (June 7, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2156050/David-Lee-Gavittcleared-killing-wife-children-house-26-years-prison.html; John Masson, Clinic Earns Murder
Exoneration
After
27
Years,
MICH.
L.
(June
7,
2012),
https://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/gavitt-exoneration.aspx.
206
On Lucas's writ of actual innocence, the state conceded that fire science evidence was newly
discovered evidence and that the state's fire science experts' opinions at trial that the fire was not
accidental, the fire was intentionally set, that an accelerant was used and present at the fire scene,
and that the petitioner's clothing indicated the presence of an accelerant were no longer valid. See
Lucas v. State, Case No. 192240032-33 (Md. Cir. 1994) at *3. The Lucas court noted that the
newly discovered evidence-which the court called "indisputably and irreparably flawed"-did
not demonstrate petitioner's actual innocence, but rather, created "a substantial or significant
possibility that the result may have been different." Id. at * 18. The court also noted, citing five
cases, that "[f]ay jurors tend to give considerable weight to scientific evidence when presented by
'experts' with impressive credentials." Id. at *19. Lucas benefited from an important decision of
the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2015, which held that newly discovered evidence includes "later
discovered scientific evidence which casts doubt upon the validity and admissibility of evidence
that was introduced at the time of trial," specifically, the admissibility and reliability of the state's
fire expert testimony which was corroborated by an unreliable witness. Ward, 221 Md. App. at
163. A petition for certiorari was filed but has been denied. Lucas v. State, 650 A.2d 239 (Md.
1994), cert. denied.
207
Joseph Awe filed a state petition for a new trial and used the fact that NFPA 921 was updated
to warn against "Negative Corpus" to show a change in the science, and the motion was therefore
granted. See State v. Awe, No. 07 CF 54 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 2013), http://thearsonproject.org/charm/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/WI v Awe.pdf (order granting motion for new trial). What was "new"
was that Mr. Awe's case was now "very much enhanced by the maturing standard which now
recognizes the 'negative corpus' methodology leads to wrong results." Id. at 2. Comparing the case
at hand to previous cases involving shaken baby syndrome, the court pointed out that the new
evidence-the shift of mainstream opinion--essentially suggested an alternate cause. Id. at 2-3.
208
William Amor was convicted of setting a fire that killed his mother in law. William Amor,
ARSON REs. PROJECT, http://thearsonproject.org/case-studies/william-amor/ (last visited Nov. 3,
2016). After 17 hours of continuous interrogation, he confessed that he had soaked newspaper in
vodka and set the newspaper aflame with a cigarette. Id. He and his wife were at a drive in movie
theater at the time of the fire. Clifford Ward, Naperville Man Gets Hearing to Dispute Conviction
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executive clemency: in Virginia, Davey Reedy received a full gubernatorial
pardon on the basis that the fire science presented in court in 1987 was no longer
reliable.2 °9 It has also been persuasive in the context of traditional federal habeas
petitions: George Souliotes presented new scientific evidence to argue that his
procedural default on his constitutional claims should be allowed to pass through
the Schlup gateway. 210 In People v. Souliotes,21 no qualified experts could
determine the fire's cause and the medium petroleum distillates found at the fire
scene and on Souliotes's shoes were determined to be different from each
other.2 The federal district court found that it was more likely than not that a
reasonable juror would have had reasonable doubt this new evidence satisfied
Schlup's exculpatory scientific evidence option. 213 Due to this finding, Souliotes
obtained relief on his constitutional claims.21 4 But, as will be described more
fully below, this argument has proven challenging to individuals who presented
a defense at trial or whose cases were tried after scientists had accepted the NFPA
921 as the guiding standard of fire investigation.
Other significant cases have proceeded through traditional habeas,
employing constitutional claims.215 The most interesting and significant of those
PM),
7:14
2016,
13,
TRiB.
(May
CHI.
Fatal Arson,
1995
in
http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/naperville-sun/ct-naperville-arson-met-20160513story.html. At the time of this writing, Mr. Amor is awaiting a hearing on his post-conviction
petition. Id. A hearing was granted for the purpose of determining whether Mr. Amor was entitled
to file successive petitions for post-conviction relief, and to decide if fire and explosion science
had evolved enough to call into question Mr. Amor's confession (which he argued was coerced)
and lead to a different result at trial. Id. Mr. Amor's attorneys argued that the fire investigation
techniques used today, which were not available at the time of Mr. Amor's trial, disprove the state's
theory of arson and that the fire techniques used at trial are no longer generally accepted in the
field. Id.
Laurence Hammack, Gov. Terry McAuliffe Pardons Roanoke's Davey Reedy, ROANOKE
209
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015, 8:37 PM), http://www.roanoke.com/news/crime/roanoke/gov-terrymcauliffe-pardons-roanoke-s-davey-reedy/article_39e4c36b-d990-557a-920174dbbd8f2b3e.html.
210
Souliotes v. Hedgpeth, No. 1:06-CV-00667 AWI, 2012 WL 2684972, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July
6, 2012).
211
See People v. Souliotes, No. F036905, 2002 WL 1797243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
212
213
Hedgepeth, 2012 WL 2684972, at *3-4. The Supreme Court in Schlup "enumerated three
categories of new reliable evidence: 'exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness
accounts, or critical physical evidence."' Brummett v. Valenzuela, No. 1: 12-CV-001 19 MJS HC,
2012 WL 4092381, at *14 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2014) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324
(1995)).
See Souliotes, No. F036905, 2002 WL 1797243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
214
215 Daniel Dougherty won a new trial based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
defense counsel's failure to challenge, in a 2000 trial, what state investigators' methodology and
conclusions were from 1985. Jeff Gammage, Retrialfor Man Who Spent 17 Years in Prisonfor
Fire That Killed His Children, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 21, 2016), http://articles.philly.com/2016-0322/news/717355231john-lentini-han-tak-lee-arson. United States v. Hebshie involved a § 2255
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cases is Han Tak Lee v. Houtzdale,2 16 which involved a state conviction on a
federal habeas claim.217 Han Tak Lee successfully claimed that his conviction
was based on inaccurate and unreliable evidence and that his continued
incarceration violated due process because newly discovered scientific evidence
showed he was probably innocent.2 18 Specifically, the prosecution presented
testimony that 62 gallons of home heating fuel and 12.2 pounds of Coleman fuel
was used to set fire to a cabin-despite the fact that gas chromatography showed
that none of the eight identified origin sites showed evidence of accelerants and
later testing proved that the pretrial testing that found accelerants on Lee's
clothing was incorrect.2 19
2.

The Problem with New Evidence Claims

The "new evidence" strategy, while promising in some instances,
remains potentially problematic in cases in which defense counsel hired experts
and presented relevant and accurate testimony at trial that was simply
outweighed by the prosecution evidence. The "new evidence" strategy may
become more and more of an impediment for modem cases as fire investigation
makes subtle progress. Two cases are useful examples: Kristine Bunch, who was
very nearly denied relief precisely because her experts at trial concluded that the
fire was in all likelihood accidental, 220 and Samuel Anstey, who was denied relief
precisely because his trial counsel properly identified issues upon which to cross
examine the state's experts, including their failure to abide by procedures
outlined in NFPA 921.221
The state's case in Bunch relied largely on expert testimony that the fire
began in two distinct locations based on three things: visual inspection and
laboratory testing of floor samples which indicated the presence of liquid
accelerant, V-patterns that pointed downward, and the myth that fires do not burn

petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise a Daubert objection on dog

alert evidence, failure to seek hearing on gas chromatography, and failure to request a hearing on
cause and origin evidence. See United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 103-22 (Mass. Dist.
Ct. 2010). The court granted the petition because of the outrageous testimony of the dog handler,
who claimed the alert dog had mystical properties, and because predecessor counsel had
specifically warned trial counsel of the necessity of challenging the arson evidence and had lined
up experts, which trial counsel dismissed despite the court repeatedly inviting such a challenge.
See id. at 98-128.
216
Lee v. Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015).
217

Lee, 798 F.3d at 162-63.

218

Id. at 169.

219

Id. at 167.

220

See Bunch v. State, 964 N.E.2d 274, 281-311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
See Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 2016).

221
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low absent the use of accelerant. 2 The laboratory analyst testified that five of
the flooring samples indicated the presence of accelerant. 223 Bunch offered
evidence at trial that there were electrical problems at her home, and her fire
investigation expert testified that the cause of the fire should be classified as
undetermined.2 24
On post-conviction, Bunch presented the testimony of John DeHaan,
who stated that at the time of Bunch's trial the effects of flashover were not well
understood, and that many of the phenomena previously associated with
incendiary fires and accelerants, such as deep V-patterns, holes in the floor, deep
charring, and pour patterns, were in fact a result of flashover. 2 5 He further
testified that he did not see any evidence of an intentional fire. 26 A second
expert, John Malooly also testified in support of Bunch's post-conviction motion,
stating that there was no basis upon which to determine this fire was incendiary
and that the phenomena the state used as support for that conclusion were a result
of flashover; Malooly went on to assert that the effects of flashover were not well
understood at the time of Bunch's trial, and that the state's experts at trial
described
these phenomena poorly and misattributed them to an intentional
227
fire.

The lower court relied on the fact that Bunch presented a defense at trial
to hold that she was not presenting anything genuinely new-that the postconviction facts and claims simply repackaged the defense witnesses'
testimony.22 8 Thus, the court barred relief on the ground that the evidence was
not new, was cumulative, and was "merely" impeaching, barring relief on the
basis of new evidence in the field of fire investigation as cumulative. 9 In other
words, because the new experts on post-conviction could not determine
definitively that the fire was caused by accident, their testimony was rejected on
the basis that it merely impeached the testimony of the state's trial experts.
Bunch's problem arose because she presented a defense at trial that was based

Bunch, 964 N.E.2d at 280. Other samples, including Bunch's nightgown, some mattress
ticking, and tap strips and paneling were also sent to the laboratory, for a total of 10 pieces of
evidence. Id.
222

223

Id.

224
225

Id.
Id. at 310 (Crone, J., dissenting).

226

Id.

Id. at 310-11 (Crone, J., dissenting).
228
Id. at 283-84 (majority opinion).
229
See id. at 290-98. Indiana's post-conviction statute requires proof of nine factors: (1) the
evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) it is material and relevant; (3) it is not cumulative;
(4) it is not merely impeaching; (5) it is not privileged or incompetent; (6) due diligence was used
to discover it in time for trial; (7) the evidence is worthy of credit; (8) it can be produced upon a
retrial of the case; and (9) it will probably produce a different result at retrial. Id. at 283.
230
Id. at 284.
227
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on qualified fire investigation. That defense, ironically, worked against her effort
to correct her wrongful conviction.231
Bunch ultimately obtained relief on fairly narrow grounds from the court
of appeals. She was able to present new evidence in the form of toxicology
evidence.232 Bunch won on this victim toxicology testimony because NFPA 921
did not recommend consideration of the physiological condition of the victim
until 2001, after Bunch's trial.233 The court accepted the analogy between shifted
fire science (specifically, victim fire toxicology) and DNA evidence to some
degree, accepting that, like DNA testing of old evidence, fire victim toxicology
improvements present a new interpretation of previously existing evidence. 4
However, the court still pointed out a significant difference between the two:
unlike DNA analysis, which can point to a perpetrator or conclusively exclude a
person, a shift in scientific understanding only 235
makes one scenario more likely
than another without offering conclusive proof.
Samuel Anstey was not as fortunate. His case was dismissed without a
hearing and affirmed throughout the appeals process.2 3 6 The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia recently affirmed the denial of relief on the grounds
that Anstey's new experts offered evidence that was cumulative of evidence
presented at trial (and cross examination of the state's experts at trial), and
because it merely impeached the evidence promulgated by the state.237
Anstey claimed that advances in fire investigation were new evidence
and that his imprisonment in light of the new evidence violated due process. 8
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded that there was no
appellate authority that stated that the methodology which departed from NFPA
921 was inadmissible or inherently unreliable (despite NFPA 921 's admonition
that procedures inconsistent with those outlined require justification and other
indicia of reliability), that NFPA 921 was not accepted as authoritative in West
Virginia, and that periodic amendments to NFPA 921 do not constitute newly
discovered evidence. 239 But the court did not stop there: it described in detail that
the two defense experts at trial concluded that the fire was accidental (likely
having started as a result of a faulty lamp in the living room) and that the charred
debris was in fact burned-out ceiling that was moved into the victim's room by
firefighters and investigators (and not likely a result of two separate origins,

231
232
233
234

See id.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.

236

Id.
Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (W. Va. 2016).

237

Id.

238

Id. at 873-74.

239

Id.

235
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which would indicate arson). 240 The court held the new evidence presented by
Anstey was not material because it was cumulative of what was presented at trial
to completely
and was only impeachment of the state's witnesses, as opposed
241
undermining or obliterating the testimony of the state's experts.
Michael Ledford 242 finds himself in a similar position, with a paucity of
avenues through which to clear his name. Ledford was convicted of killing his
one-year-old son on the day of his first birthday party as a result of a fire that
Ledford allegedly set in his apartment.243 The evidence against him consisted of
erroneous testimony by a state investigator that the living room in which the fire
occurred experienced flashover and an insurance investigator's conclusion that
the fire was a result of arson.2 44 Both investigators came to this conclusion only
after Ledford was interrogated-using discredited and dangerous interrogation
tactics-and confessed, nearly a month after the fire. 245 The investigators
changed their opinion about the area of origin and the cause after the confession,
the facts of which did not fit the empirical evidence.246 Neither arson investigator
followed the NFPA 921 in their final analysis.247 Moreover, the state's lay
witnesses established a timeline (consistent with Ledford's own description of
events) pursuant to which it would have actually been impossible for Ledford to
have started the fire. 24 8 Ledford's trial counsel presented the testimony of a
respected fire engineer and investigator, who explained that the state's theory of
the case-an open flame-would have resulted in flashover within 2 or so
minutes rather than the self-extinguishing fire that peaked a full 15 to 20 minutes
after Ledford left the house.249 Video of a test bum would have demonstrated this
in a dramatic and visual way, but the court excluded this video from evidence

240

Id. at 872.

241
Id. at 874-79. The court distinguished Anstey from Bunch on the basis that Bunch lacked
evidence of motive. Id. at 880 n.56.
See The Imaginary Thrown Candle into a Polyurethane Chair, INNOCENT IN PRISON,
242
http://www.mikeledfordthrowncandle.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). Michael Ledford is
represented by Parisa Dehghani-Tafti at the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project (along with co-counsel
from the law firm of Baker Botts) and Paul Bieber has provided expert counseling and a report in
support of Mr. Ledford's efforts to regain freedom.
STEPHEN M. OLENICK ET AL., RE-VISITING THE MICHAEL LEDFORD FIRE INCIDENT 2 (2010),
243
http://www.mikeledfordthrowncandle.com/uploads/2/7/3/6/2736084/cse isfi_2010-paper.color.
pdf.
244
JOHN B. ALLEN, IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL L. LEDFORD, # 1014878, PETITIONER: PETITION
160-62
(2012),
PARDON
FOR
ABSOLUTE
http://www.skepticaljurordocs.com/documents/2013/05/ledford-petition-absolute-pardon.pdf.
245
See id. at 5-18.

248

Id. at 5.
See id. at 29.
Id. at 22.

249

See id. at 161.

246
247
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and the jury found Ledford guilty.250 In spite of the evidence that Ledford did not
start the fire, he still faces significant hurdles because he has exhausted or
defaulted the procedural avenues available to him.251
3. False Evidence
Although an arson case has yet to be decided on the basis of false
evidence being presented,252 it is hardly a stretch to apply the lessons of the hair
microscopy review conducted by the FBI in collaboration with the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
("NACDL") to arson. These lessons should apply particularly in cases that postdate the widespread acceptance of NFPA 921 and cases in which experts are
permitted to testify beyond their area of expertise. In 2013, the FBI and the DOJ,
in collaboration with the NACDL and the Innocence Project, initiated an internal
review of all cases in which the FBI laboratory performed microscopic hair
analysis and in which FBI agents provided testimony at trial. 3 In theory, hair
microscopy analysis purported to differentiate between individuals based on
qualities of their hairs. The theory behind hair microscopy was that an individual
could be included or excluded from the population of potential donors who could
have deposited hair at the crime scene based on how similar or dissimilar the
suspect's hair was to the forensic sample.254 In practice, the 2013 FBI review
concluded that in more than 95% of cases, analysts overstated what their hair
microscopy could possibly prove and actually gave the impression that the
defendants' hairs were identicalto the hairs left at the crime scene, often stating
that in thousands of analyses the analyst in question had never seen two hairs so
closely similar or claiming they could differentiate between the hairs of identical

250

Id. at 22.

Id. at 5.
252
Souliotes v. Grounds, No. 1:06-CV-00667 AWI, 2013 WL 875952, at *15-17 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 7, 2013). George Souliotes pursued a claim of presentation of false evidence under Napue v.
Illinois,but those claims were denied on the basis that although evidence used to convict Souliotes
was false and prejudicial, the false evidence was presented in good faith. Id. at *16. The federal
district court granted relief on other grounds. Id. at *59. An ongoing California case argues that
the introduction of false arson science at a trial predating NFPA 921's recognition as a standard
violated Joann Parks's due process rights. JoAnn Parks, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/joann-parks/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
This case, discussed in more detail below, also relies on California's newly added habeas provision,
which permits a petitioner to seek relief on the basis that the scientific evidence presented at trial
and material to petitioner's guilt has been "undermined by later scientific research or technological
advances." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (West 2016).
253
Norman L. Reimer, The Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review Project: A
Milestone in the Quest for Forensic Science Reform (Inside NACDL), NACDL (May 2015),
https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=37319&terms=hair+analysis.
254
See id.
251
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twins.2 5 Those cases can be litigated on three claims: presentation of false
evidence by the prosecution under Napue v. Illinois, 256 misleading evidence
under Alcorta v. Texas, 257 or a fundamental fairness argument that one should
not be convicted and imprisoned on evidence that is learned to be false after
trial. 8
It is a due process violation for the government to obtain a conviction
through the use of false or misleading evidence. 259 To succeed on a traditional
claim that false or misleading evidence was presented at trial, a petitioner needs
to prove that the false or misleading evidence was introduced at trial and that
there is "any reasonable likelihood" the evidence "affected the judgment of the
jury. 26 ° Of course, the presentation of false evidence needs to be deliberate on
the part of the prosecutor, even if it is simply a failure to correct unsolicited false
evidence.61 Promulgation of false evidence and nondisclosure of exculpatory
evidence are intertwined in the sense that the underlying goal of categorizing
both violations as constitutional violations is the need to preserve the truthfinding process and to avoid unfair trials.
In the context of arson prosecutions this argument would be particularly
relevant in post-2000 cases, after the DOJ declared NFPA 921 as the benchmark
of fire investigation, or in cases where an expert overreached in their testimony.
While generally it is required that the falsity was hidden from the defense or not
capable of being discovered, scientific or technical testimony has the imprimatur
of truth when presented by the state.262 Since testimony from state experts is
frequently provided by state employees who are not specifically collecting a fee
for their testimony-and therefore appear to be objective-jurors assume that
the court has performed a gatekeeper function and is only permitting valid
evidence.263 More often than not, these state employees testify that a fire was
arson, a fingerprint matches, DNA is consistent-all forms of testimony that are

255
2015),

Spencer S. Hsu, FBIAdmits Flaws in HairAnalysis Over Decades, WASH. POST, (Apr. 18,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-

nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-1 Ie4-b5 10962fcfabc3 10_story.html. The review was initiated after the NAS report identified permissible and

improper uses of the practice and after DNA testing proved the analysis to be flawed. After
finishing its review of the first 268 cases, the FBI has reported that improper testimony was
presented in more than 95% of the reviewed cases involving hair microscopy. Id.
256
257

360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
355 U.S. 28, 30-32 (1957).

See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. at 264; Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 28.
260
Napue, 360 U.S. at 271.
261
Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 31-32.
262
See Bennett L. Gersham, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 315
(2000-2001).
258

259

263

Id.
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definite, understandable, and consistent with expectations from television and
crime shows. Defense experts, in contrast, are almost inevitably paid experts and
tend to testify that a fire's cause was undetermined, that fingerprints are not
consistent with the defendant, that a lab did not follow their own protocols, or
that population statistics with respect to DNA are misleading-none of which is
testimony that inspire confidence or resolves the who-done-it in a neat way, and
none of which affirmatively proves "the truth." Indeed, in Mr. Ledford's case,
the state presented testimony that the fire had started on top of a chair cushion
with an open flame (with a candle).2 64 It was a persuasive, coherent story. In
contrast, very reputable defense experts were left testifying that it could not have
happened with an open flame (without causing flashover in two minutes) but
were unable to describe what did happen because of court rulings and the
destruction of the fire scene and its contents.265 It was a less compelling story,
even though it was more accurate.
Han Tak Lee offers some hope because it squarely held that it is a due
process violation to be convicted and incarcerated on the basis of incorrect
evidence.26 6 The next reasonable step is for trial counsel to make constitutional
arguments that certain types of purportedly scientific evidence violate a
defendant's right to due process because they are unvalidated, unscientific
evidence. These constitutional arguments would apply to evidence being used by
the state in arson cases which implicitly relies on Negative Corpus, which
involves unsubstantiated canine alerts, which relies too heavily-and in the face
of other empirical evidence-on witness statements. The constitutional
arguments go beyond the standards of reliability outlined by evidentiary rules,
but to something more fundamental, namely, that the right to a fair trial is
implicated in the admission of evidence for which an error rate cannot be
identified (or the error rate is intolerably high), for evidence that has not been
scientifically demonstrated to be accurate, or for evidence that overreaches the
bounds of the witnesses' expertise.
V. PROPOSED SYSTEMIC SCIENTIFIC AND LEGISLATIVE REFORMS

If more than 1,900267 individuals who have been exonerated as of this
writing prove anything, it is that there are presently countless prisoners locked
up in the United States for crimes they did not commit. But none of the postconviction remedies within our criminal justice system-not direct appeals, not
habeas review, not even all actual innocence claims-provides incarcerated
individuals with a meaningful path to prove their innocence. This is particularly

264

See ALLEN, supra note 244, at 153.

265

See id. at 28.

266

Lee v. Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2015).

267

See The NationalRegistry of Exonerations,supranote 3.
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true for those convicted of arson crimes on the basis of junk science. Therefore,
in order to properly address the seemingly irreconcilable conflict challenges
raised by a criminal justice system built on finality but dependent on science, the
time has come for us to consider systemic reforms, not just to the specific
techniques of fire and arson investigation, but also more importantly to the
broader question of how we legislate and litigate innocence claims in the context
of evolving scientific norms.
A. Systemic Scientific Reforms
The first area of systemic reform is improving the science itself. Fire
investigation has come a long way since Hak Tan Lee, Todd Willingham, and
David Lee Gavitt were convicted of intentionally setting fires that killed their
families. Since the publication of NFPA 921, the increased reliance on a
systematic process and the scientific method has clearly helped to move fire
scene examination towards a more stable footing. NFPA 921's recent rejection
of Negative Corpus as an acceptable methodology was a significant boost to the
discipline's credibility.
However, lingering questions persist in regards to the underlying
reliability and validity of some techniques. And while some clearly unscientific
and outdated techniques have been rejected ("pour-pattern," crazed-glass,
concrete spalling, etc.), other equally unreliable and unmeasured processes (area
of origin determination in a post-flashover fire, unconfirmed alerts of accelerant
detection canines, negative corpus, etc.) have taken their place, resulting in
changing the process, but maintaining the result in the form of a new generation
of wrongful arson convictions. When it comes to making genuine improvements
to a field of forensic science, exchanging one set of outdated and unmeasured
methodologies with a new set of equally unreliable techniques is no improvement
at all.
But there is much that can still be improved, beginning with a genuine
effort by the fire investigation community to rigorously measure the foundational
reliability and rate of error of every forensic methodology on which they propose
to proffer expert testimony. These improvements will require coordinated efforts
between federal and state government agencies, attorneys, and the scientific
community to ensure that imprisoned individuals convicted of arson or arsonrelated killings receive a hard and fair look at their cases, that future defendants
are tried on accurate and scientifically valid evidence, and that the science of fire
investigation continues to engage in and learn from the scientific method. To that
end, there are several (not exhaustive) categories of reform we propose:
1. Recognizing the Level of Damage and Its Effects on Accuracy
The reliability and accuracy of conclusions in any forensic domain are
directly related to the quality and quantity of physical evidence available for
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examination and the methodologies used to analyze that evidence. Flashover,
full-room involvement, building collapse, and extended overhaul are just a few
of the factors that create complex fire-scene conditions that negatively affect the
amount and clarity of information contained in the physical evidence and tend to
limit the fire investigator's ability to draw reliable, valid, and specific
conclusions based on fire-pattern and fire-dynamics analysis. Guidelines and
training assist the fire investigator in recognizing the threshold of damage beyond
which otherwise acceptable methodologies lose their value is sorely needed.
The reliability and accuracy of area of origin determination in postflashover, ventilation controlled fire conditions are simply unknown. Research
is needed to develop specific methods and procedures in determining a fire's true
area of origin under these conditions. Until such methodologies are developed,
tested, and measured for accuracy, fire investigators should limit their area of
origin determination to the "room of origin" or another area of sufficient size to
encompass all possible locations where the fire might have begun.
2. Witness Statements
The misuse of witness statements in fire investigation is both concerning
and widespread. Greater clarity is needed in guidelines and training to assist the
fire investigator in understanding that a witness's statement may be helpful to
develop a working hypothesis regarding the origin, cause, or development of a
fire, but final conclusions must be based on the application of accepted
methodologies to the examination of physical and empirical evidence.
3. Negative Corpus
In spite of NFPA 921's recent rejection of the Negative Corpus
methodology as a clear violation of the scientific method, it remains a common
practice among fire investigators to base expert conclusions on the absence of
physical evidence.268 Stronger measures, in the form of professional standards
and targeted training, are needed for NFPA 921's guidelines to be understood
and accepted by forensic fire-scene examiners.
4. Inclusion and Exclusion of Electrical Appliances
Elimination of an electrical appliance or electrical conductor as a heat or
ignition source by visual examination, especially in the field, is a common and
troubling feature of many fire-scene examinations. 269 Further research is needed
to measure the reliability and accuracy of fire investigators in excluding or
See Guy E. Burnette, Jr., Origin and Cause: Legal Standards of Proof,INTER FIRE ONLINE,
268
http://www.interfire.org/res file/oclegal.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
ALLEN, supra note 244, at 168.
269
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including electrical appliances and the investigator's ability in recognizing and
attributing post-fire artifacts. Standardized examination methodologies and
procedures, that are tested for error and accuracy, would assist in meeting this
need.
5. Acknowledging and Minimizing Bias
The presence and impact of role bias, expectation and confirmation bias,
and selective re-examination bias in fire investigation is subtle, but real. More
research on the real-world effects of biasing information on fire-scene
examination is needed. Until policies and standards are developed to minimize
and control the underlying causes of cognitive bias, the reliability of conclusions
based on fire-scene investigation will remain controversial.
6.

270
Shielding Fire Investigators from Domain-Irrelevant Information

The current framework for fire-scene examination, specifically within
the public sector, can expose fire investigators to ancillary information that is
neither within their forensic domain nor relevant to the purpose of the
examination that they are tasked to perform. Appropriate policies will go some
way to protect the origin-and-cause investigator from this type of information.
Adopting the recommendations developed by the National Commission on
Forensic Science in the area of shielding forensic practitioners from exposure to
task-irrelevant information would be an excellent first step in meeting this
challenging goal. 71
In those circumstances where, in spite of policies to the contrary, a firescene examiner is exposed to biasing information, a system for the examiner to
recuse himself or herself from the investigation and be replaced with an examiner
that has not been exposed to the biasing information should be used.
7.

Context-Free Secondary Examinations

Secondary examinations must be conducted in an environment free of
contextual biasing information, where expert conclusions are based only on
evidence relevant to the secondary examiner's area of expertise. When
requesting a secondary examination, policies should shield the secondary
examiner from potentially biasing information and from the conclusions of
previous examiners. In fire investigation, protocols designed to allow for the

270

Itiel E. Dror, PracticalSolutions to Cognitive and Human Factor Challenges in Forensic

Science, 4 FORENSIC SCI POL'Y & MGMT. 105 (2013).
271
See NAT'L COMM'N ON FORENSIC SCI., ENSURING THAT FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON
TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/641676/download.
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sequential unmasking of evidence can be of particular value in a context-free,
secondary examination setting.27
8. Separating Fire-Scene Examination from Criminal Investigation
Separating the role of the origin-and-cause examiner from that of the
criminal investigator is perhaps the single most critical improvement to current
fire-investigation practice and almost certainly the most difficult to accomplish.
The current culture of the public-sector fire investigator participating in both the
scene examination and the wider criminal investigation is well entrenched. The
formation of teams made up of fire department origin-and-cause examiners with
police detectives specializing in arson investigation is especially problematic, as
it tends to reinforce the overlap of the two vocations rather than separate them.
It is crucial to an objective forensic analysis that the two roles be
separate. A forensic examiner conducting a fire-scene examination for the
purpose of determining the area of origin and causation of a fire must not
participate in any parallel or subsequent criminal investigation based directly or
indirectly on his origin-and-cause conclusions. This is the recommendation
contained in the NAS Report to discourage the effects of cognitive bias and
promote independence and objectivity in a reliable and professional forensic
analysis.
9. Exclusion of Questionable Testimony
The Texas Forensic Science Commission's ("FSC") report on
Willingham encouraged trial lawyers in criminal cases to "aggressively pursue
admissibility hearings in arson cases" because of the rapidly changing discipline
and the still-unshakable wrong beliefs presented by purported experts.2 73 The
report also pointed out that forensic disciplines have a "(1) duty to correct; (2)
to] implement[]
duty to inform; (3) duty to be transparent; and (4) [duty
274
corrective action" when new scientific knowledge develops.

Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in
ForensicDNA Interpretation,53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 1006 (2008).
272

273
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FORENSIC

SCI.

COMM'N,

WILLJNGHAM/WILLIS

INVESTIGATION
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(2011),

http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINAL.pdf.
Id. at 41.
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10. Accelerant Detecting Canines
276
The limitations expressed in NFPA 921275 and the CADA position
paper regarding the use of accelerant detecting canines and portable hydrocarbon
detectors should be understood and followed. Policies should be developed that
recognize the difference between a presumptive test, such as a dog alert, and a
confirmatory test, such as GC/MS analysis, and the level of confidence to be
placed in each. Canine alerts, particularly in the context of negative gas
chromatography results, are like police testifying that they believed a defendant
possessed cocaine when the lab results on the evidence recovered from the
suspect were negative for cocaine.277

B. Systemic Legislative and LitigationReforms
With all of that being said, it remains that improvements in fire
investigation alone will not get to the root of the problem: a legal system built on
finality but relying on science, which is by design always in flux. We have
reviewed above the avenues for post-conviction litigation in arson cases in order
to show that the solution to helping exonerate persons falsely convicted of arson
crimes does not lay in better and more effective litigation strategies. The truth is
the 1880 plus people who have been exonerated so far were able to prove their
innocence because of the heroic efforts of the innocence project, public
defenders, and pro bono private bar lawyers. Day in and day out, in the teeth of
seemingly insurmountable procedural bars and constitutional review standards,
these lawyers continue to fight on behalf of those who remain unjustly behind
bars. But that work, heroic though it may be, cannot fully account for the
fundamental flaw in a judicial system that does not permit an innocent person to
challenge their conviction effectively, even when we know the science upon
which they were convicted is bad.
One possible solution is the Texas post-conviction remedy model, which
provides a judicial avenue for such appeals and incorporates the stakeholders on
both the science and the legal sides of the issue.278 Though imperfect, the Texas
model involves three components: first, a so-called "junk science writ" within
the state habeas corpus statute that permits court entry based on newly discovered
evidence of bad science being used for conviction; 279 second, the creation of the

275
See e.g., JOHN D. DEHAAN, KIRK'S FIRE INVESTIGATION 543 (6th ed. 2006). See generally
NFPA 921, supra note 7.
276
See CADA 'sPosition, supra note 102; NFPA 921, supra note 7, at 103.
277
This extraordinary example was provided by Bruce L. Ottley, Beyond the Crime
Laboratory:The Admissibility of Unconfirmed ForensicEvidence in Arson Cases, 36 NEw ENG. J.
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 263, 266 (2010).
278
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West 2015).
279
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Forensic Science Commission, which is tasked with reviewing cases with
forensic science problems; 280 and third, the involvement of the Texas Criminal
Justice Integrity Unit in reviewing strengths and weaknesses of the Texas
criminal justice system and bringing about reform.281
1. Junk Science Writ
The Texas legislature first passed the "Junk Science" Writ, S.B.344, in
June 2013.282 The Writ permits a defendant to bring a habeas corpus claim on the
basis of new or changed scientific evidence.28 3 Specifically, the Junk Science
Writ applies to scientific evidence that was either not available at the time of trial
or scientific evidence that contradicts the evidence relied on by the state at
trial.28 4 A petitioner must allege facts indicating that (1) the relevant scientific
evidence is currently available, but was not reasonably ascertainable through due
diligence at the time of trial; (2) the new evidence would be admissible under
Texas Rules of Evidence if a trial were held on the date of the application; and
(3) had the scientific evidence been presented at trial, the defendant would not
have been convicted under a preponderance of evidence standard. 285 The
scientific evidence must be truly new (not previously discoverable) and the court
must consider whether the scientific field has changed since the trial date(s) (for
a first time application) or the date of the original application (for a subsequent
application).2 86
Significantly-and in contrast to many innocence protection schemesthe right to invoke S.B. 344 is not affected by a confession, acceptance of a guilty
plea, or recantation of original testimony.28 7 In addition, the new provision

280

About Us, TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, http://www.fsc.texas.gov/about (last visited Nov.

3, 2016). In addition, the above source indicates that the creation of the Forensic Science
Commission ("FSC") was in 2005, prior the enactment of the "Junk Science Writ."
281

Welcome to the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit, TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY

UNIT, http://www.txcourts.gov/cca/texas-criminal-justice-integrity-unit.aspx (last visited Nov. 3,

2016).
282

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West 2016).

Linda Rodriguez McRobbie, In Texas, a New Law Lets Defendants Fight Bad Science,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/02/in-texas-a-newlaw-lets-defendants-fight-bad-science/283895/.
284
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(a)(1)-(2) (West 2016).
285
Id. art 11 .073(b)(1)(A)-(B).
283

286
287

Id. art 11.073(d)(1)-(2).
See id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/6

64

Dehghani-Tafti and Bieber: Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson Investigation and

FOLKLORE AND FORENSICS

2016]

permits second or successive petitions if the new basis asserted for relief is new
or changed scientific evidence.2 88
Since its passage, the Junk Science Writ has been invoked in several
high-profile cases in Texas, including the "San Antonio Four" case, the Frances
and Dan Keller child abuse case, 289 and the Sonia Cacy arson case. 290 The San
Antonio Four case involved four women who were convicted of child sex abuse
in 1994.291 At trial, an expert witness testified that a scar found on one of the
children's hymens could only have been caused by sexual abuse.292 The medical
reports even suggested that the sexual abuse was connected to a satanic ritual.293
Nine years after the convictions, however, the American Academy of
Pediatrics published a study advising that torn or injured hymens do not leave
scarring and the expert trial witness retracted her testimony.294 Despite the
outcome of the study, the San Antonio four remained in prison because they did
not have a form of relief that would allow them to bring up the new study.2 95
With the passage of the Junk Science Writ, the four women had their convictions
overturned in 2013 after demonstrating that, using new medical standards, the
science behind the expert testimony did not corroborate the alleged victims'
claims.29 6 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the newly available
evidence, a portion of which was the unreliable scientific testimony,
"unquestionably established" their innocence.297
Frances and Dan Keller's convictions for child sexual abuse were also
overturned under the Junk Science Writ.298 Convicted in 1992, the Kellers'
conviction centered on the testimony of an ER doctor who had examined one of

288

Sabra Thomas, Comment, Addressing Wrongful Convictions: An Examination of Texas 's

New Junk Science Writ and OtherMeasuresfor Protectingthe Innocent, 52 Hous. L. REv. 1037,
1051 (2015).
289

Id., at 1051-55.

Brantley Hargrove, Sonia Cacy Found to Be Innocent, TEX. MONTHLY (June 6, 2016),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/sonia.
291 Thomas, supra note 288, at 1052.
292
Id.
Id.
293
Id. at 1052-53.
294
290

295

Id. at 1053.

Id. The habeas court relied also on the recantations of two of the complaining witnesses.
297
Exparte Kristie Mayhugh, Nos. WR-84,700-1 & WR-84,700-2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. filed
Nov. 23, 2016). The four women were not declared innocent on the basis of the scientific testimony
alone; the petitioners also presented recantations from one of the alleged victims, evidence that the
alleged victims made their accusations under duress, expert evidence addressing why the alleged
victims would come to believe in a crime that never occurred, and expert testimony that the
petitioners are not and never were sex offenders. Id. at 3-6. In other words, exposure of a forensic
discipline as unreliable science, while helpful, was not enough.
298
Thomas, supra note 288, at 1054.
296
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the children and testified that lacerations on the girl's hymen could be indications
of sexual abuse. 2 99 The doctor subsequently recanted his testimony, stating that
he has since realized that his conclusions (which he believed were accurate
during the trial) were not "scientifically or medically valid."3 ° The Kellers were
able to demonstrate, through their writ of habeas corpus, that scientific standards
had changed since the time of the trial and their convictions were vacated. 30 1
The third high-profile case involved the 1993 conviction of Sonia Cacy
for murdering her uncle by setting him on fire.30 2 In 1996, as a part of her
punishment retrial, Cacy's attorney enlisted the help of Dr. Hurst to analyze the
forensic evidence used to convict her.30 3 Dr. Hurst found that the original tests
had been misread and that the compounds present merely indicated that the fire
burned some plastic, not that an accelerant was used as was testified at trial.30 4
Cacy's conviction was affirmed despite this determination.3 0 5 In 1998, Cacy's
attorney submitted numerous reports from arson experts and pathologists that
concluded the fire was accidental; the Board of Pardon and Paroles released
Cacy.306
In 2012, Cacy submitted a report to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
that included a letter from the expert witness who testified regarding the
accelerant's presence, admitting that the clothing samples he tested were
contaminated.30 7 Significantly, the entire case against Cacy had rested on that
witness's conclusions and testimony-without that, the medical examiner would
not have ruled the death a homicide and the fire investigator would not have
testified that the fire was arson.30 8 Cacy was exonerated under the Junk Science
Writ.30 9 On November 2, 2016, Sonia Cacy was declared actually innocent by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 310 The Court determined that she was not
competently represented by counsel and the scientific evidence used to convict
her was false and unreliable.3 11

299

Id.
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Id.
Id.
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Hargrove, supra note 290.

303

Id.

304

Id.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
Id.
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Brantley Hargrove, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Declares Sonia Cacy Actually
Innocent, TEX. MONTHLY (November 3, 2016), http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-dailypost/texas-court-criminal-appeals-declares-sonia-cacy-actually-innocent/.
310

311

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/6

66

Dehghani-Tafti and Bieber: Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson Investigation and

2016]

FOLKLORE AND FORENSICS

To be sure, the Junk Science Writ goes far in ensuring that a remedy is
available to those individuals who have been convicted and witnessed a paradigm
shift in the forensic disciplines that played a significant role in their convictions.
But it does not go far enough. The problem with this and other post-conviction
remedies is that there is too bright a line as to what constitutes "new" evidencea line that does not correspond to reality. Technically, the Writ is also
discretionary, so it does not guarantee that unjust convictions will be overturned.
The language in the writ states that the court may grant relief if all requirements
relief.3 12
are satisfied by the defendant-not that the court shall or must grant
This discretionary language causes some to question whether the writ will
actually be effective.3 13 Incidentally, and perhaps significantly, it is unclear what
would be the fate of a case in which an expert employed by the state at trial did
not recant his or her own testimony-the cases in which relief has been granted
all involve the trial expert's own recantation, rather than the introduction of a
new expert.
Finally, the Junk Science Writ still allows faulty or misleading evidence
to be introduced at trial.314 The Writ fails to address the issue of when faulty or
skewed evidence is presented. The workability and constitutional significance of
Daubert,Frye, and other similar gateway analyses regarding the admissibility of
science or technical expertise must be revaluated, but a full discussion of this
recommendation is beyond the scope of this Article.315

312
313
314

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 11.073(b) (West 2015).
See Thomas, supra note 288.
Id. at 1040-44.

California, too, has adopted a junk science bill. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1473 (West 2015).
California Senate Bill 1058 was approved on September 26, 2014, as a criminal procedure
amendment to Section 1473 of the Penal Code. Governor Signs Leno Bill Helping to Prevent
2015),
29,
(Sept.
LENO
MARK
SENATOR
Convictions,
Wrongful
http://sdl 1.senate.ca.gov/news/2014-09-29-govemor-signs-leno-bill-helping-prevent-wrongfulconvictions. S.B. 1058 officially became law on January 1, 2015. Id. Sponsored by the California
Innocence Project and the Northern California Innocence Project, the bill seeks to address the fact
that forensic science testing errors are the second most common factor in wrongful convictions
cases in the United States. Id. Before the enactment of S.B. 1058, California law allowed for
anyone unlawfully imprisoned or restrained to file a writ of habeas corpus for a specified reason
that could include if false evidence was introduced at trial that was material or probative of the
defendant's guilt or punishment. See id. In addition, the previous law gave the judge the ability to
reconsider convictions if a material witness recanted their testimony. See id. S.B. 1058, however,
expands the existing law's definition of false evidence to include expert witness's opinions that
have been repudiated by the original expert or have been undermined by advances in science and
technology. Id. How this provision plays out remains to be seen, but a test case is currently in
litigation. See generallyIn re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016).
315
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2. Texas Forensic Science Commission
The Texas Forensic Science Commission ("the Commission") was
created by House Bill 1068 in May 2005. 16 Its purpose is to investigate cases in
which science used at trial is now believed to be false or flawed, and to issue a
recommendation that a petitioner can use in an application for a writ of habeas
corpus.3 17 With the passage of the Junk Science Writ and the Michael Morton
Act,318 which forced Texas prosecutors to open their files to attorneys
representing individuals in post-conviction remedy appeals, the Commission has
been able to review an increasing number of cases.319
The Commission receives complaints from current and former inmates
and their families, national advocacy groups, former and current lab employees,
and others.320 As of November 2015, the Commission had received 126
complaints and an additional 17 self-disclosures. 321 The bulk of the
Commission's work is currently focused on discipline specific reviewsmicroscopic hair analysis, DNA mixture interpretation analysis, bite mark

316

About Us, supra note 280.

Michael
Hall,
False
Impressions,
TEX.
MONTHLY
(Jan.
2016),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/false-impressions/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
318
The Michael Morton Act (S.B. 1611) was signed into law May 16, 2013, and took effect
January 1, 2014. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015). Passed by the 83rd
Texas Legislature, the Act made changes to Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
for the first time since 1965. See id. The Act was named after Michael Morton who was exonerated
in December 2011 after spending almost 25 years in prison for the murder of his wife. TEX.
317

APPLESEED & TEX. DEF. SERV., TOwARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE: THE MICHAEL MORTON

ACT'S

FIRST

YEAR

iii

(2015),

http://texasdefender.org/wp-

content/uploads/TowardsMoreTransparentJustice.pdf. The prosecutor in Morton's case
knowingly hid evidence that, once tested for DNA, indicated Morton was innocent and another
man was the true offender. Id. Before the passage of the Act, trial courts were greatly limited in
the types of discovery that they could mandate and defendants had no real statutory right to
discovery without a court order. Id. at ii-iii. However, with the Act, the Texas Legislature ensured
that defendants have access to all relevant materials and information favorable to their case in
order to best investigate and prepare. Id. The State has an obligation to disclose any information
favorable to the defense regardless of whether it is exculpatory, impeaching, or mitigating. Id. The
State's obligation to produce continues after the final conviction and materials must be provided
to the defense as soon as is practical after the prosecution receives a request. Id. The Act is very
broad in favor of the defense, but allows for two exceptions to the production of documents or
information-work product or written communications between the prosecutors and other agents
of the state. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2015).
319
TEX. APPLESEED & DEF. SERV., supra note 318, at i-iii.
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http://www.fsc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/205 5%20FSC%2OAnnual%20Report
%20Posted%20Smaller%20Size.pdf.
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Id. Of the 143 cases, 131 were disposed of either through dismissal by the Commission,
investigation and a submitted report, or through a referral to another agency. Id.
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analysis, and arson case review. 322 The Commission began working closely with
the Texas State Fire Marshal's Office on arson cases after the Commission
received 17 complaints in April 2011.323
The Commission's work is not perfect: Its jurisdiction may be limited to
cases that were litigated after its creation (prompting the Commission to issue a
no recommendation letter based on lack of jurisdiction in the Sonia Cacy), and
complaints involving accredited labs (and, by extension, work that required
accreditation). 324 It is still somewhat unclear what limitations, or lack thereof,

exist on its work or how proactive a role it will take in preventing the admission
of questionable science in the courtroom.
3. Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit
The Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit is an ad hoc committee
established in June 2008.325 It was tasked with addressing seven core issues
centered around higher quality defense counsel for indigent defendants, attorney
accountability, compensation for the wrongfully convicted, and reform in terms
of evidence handling, interrogations, and eyewitness identifications.326 The Unit
leads education and training reforms to address these issues in conjunction with

322
Id at 16-22. The Commission formed a Hair Microscopy Review Team in January 2014,
and by November 2015, 693 cases were submitted and the team had sought out an additional 120
cases. Id. at 18. Additional screening was able to reduce the caseload to 287 and the team has been
reviewing and making recommendations. Id. The Commission's work with hair microscopy made
Texas the first state to do a review of cases that had relied on hair comparison analysis. Hall, supra
note 317. Since the case that started the Commission's involvement, the Texas Association of
Crime Lab Directors has encouraged crime labs to send the Commission cases involving hair
analysis. Id.
The Commission has been working with various groups to ensure uniform, accurate, and
appropriate interpretation of DNA mixtures, and in particular problems with the population
statistics that crime labs were using to analyze DNA centered cases. TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N,
supra note 320, at 20; Hall, supra note 317. In order to do this, the Commission instituted a plan
to have each lab submit 10 cases per decade in order to show their protocols and allow for the
Commission's experts to study them for issues. Hall, supra note 317.
In September 2015, the Commission's Bite Mark Comparison Review Panel had their first meeting
and has since been determining the appropriate use, limitations, and role of bite mark evidence and
within months had reviewed over 30 cases. TEX. FORENSIC ScI. COMM'N, supra note 320, at 2122.
Due to the expanding responsibilities of the Commission, the legislature, in 2015, doubled their
budget to $500,000. Hall, supranote 317.
323 TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM'N, supra note 320, at 20.
324

Id.

325

Welcome to the Texas CriminalJustice Integrity Unity, supra note 281.

326

TEX. CRIMrNAL JUSTICE UNIT,

ANNUAL

REPORT

OF

ACTIVITIES

3

(Dec.

2009),

http://www.txcourts.gov/media/253235/tcjiu-2009-report.pdf.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2016

69

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119

organizations including the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer
Standards and Education ("TCLEOSE").327
The Unit has also determined that approximately half of all surveyed
judges had received no training on forensic science in the previous year and both
required and requested training regarding the standards of reliability of scientific
evidence.32 8 As a result, the Unit worked to develop forensic science training
programs to educate those involved in the criminal justice system. 329 With

respect to the use of changing science in wrongful conviction cases, the Unit
became one of the first organizations in Texas to educate those who work in the
criminal justice system, as well as the public, about developments in fire science
and arson investigations.33 °
Despite the affirmative steps the Unit has taken over the years to address
their goals, there still exists criticism of the Unit's creation and effectiveness.
The Court of Criminal Appeals worked to create the Unit, but the court itself is
viewed by some as a part of the problem of wrongful convictions.331 While the
prevailing opinion is that the court is a trailblazer in creating the Unit, the Unit
is sometimes viewed as an attempt to improve the court's public image following
a few high-profile "embarrassing decisions. ' '332 Another criticism is that the
Unit's topics of focus may be too broad to be truly effective.333 Mandating
training through the Unit addresses a small aspect of the system's larger issues.
A more meaningful, targeted approach would be to focus on improving the laws
addressing post-conviction procedures and standards and identifying meritorious
cases. 334 Thus, whether and how deep its effect on stakeholders in the system
will be remains to be seen, as does the possibility of its work having direct effect
on cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

"Absolute certainty is not a feature of many credible claims of
innocence. Consequently, in the most difficult cases, society must engage in the
distribution of risk., 335 The current distribution, which overwhelmingly values

327

Id. at 6.
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Id.
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Jordan Smith, A Dose of Integrity for Texas Criminal Justice, AUSTIN CHRON. (June 27,
2008), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2008-06-27/640107/.
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333
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335
Robert J. Smith, RecalibratingConstitutionalInnocence Protection,87 WASH. L. REv. 139,

146 (2012).
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finality and comity over justice and innocence, might have made sense when
prosecutions and convictions relied primarily on subjective evidence like
memory and eyewitness testimony. Memory and credibility can, at least
arguably, be vetted primarily by a jury sitting in a courtroom listening to a
witness and determining whether the person should be believed. Once the jury
issues a verdict in such cases, it becomes challenging for a reviewing court to go
back through the cold paper record and determine either on direct appeal or
collateral review whether the jury's faith in the witness's credibility was
misplaced.
However, a calculus that values comity and finality above all else makes
little sense when modem prosecutions rely on an array of forensic evidence that
can be independently evaluated and that do not degrade, but is only perfected,
over time. Men have been exonerated of rape charges decades after the victim
identified them in court because a tiny piece of biological material caught on a
stray fabric and dumped in the back of a police storage facility ultimately proved,
without a doubt, that they did not commit the crime.336 The notion that procedural
due process, comity, and finality should prevent us from aggressively adopting
systemic reforms to make it easier for these wrongfully convicted individuals to
use new scientific evidence to prove their innocence seems both morally
repugnant and dangerously atavistic.
In a fundamental way, fire investigation, poised between folklore and
forensics, perfectly captures the dilemma in which the criminal justice system,
also poised between the subjective evidence of the past and the objective science
of the future, now finds itself. The men and women introduced at the beginning
of the Article were convicted of arson on the basis of testimony we now know
has little basis in fact and less connection with science than the juries were led to
believe. And yet, the criminal justice system makes it enormously-if not
impossibly--difficult for them to prove their innocence. Instead, it demands that
individual attorneys go on heroic quests to right the system's wrongs. These
attorneys deserve our admiration, but they-and the clients they serve-also
deserve a more just system.

Alexi Friedman, Newark Man Jailedfor 22 Years in Rape Case Demands DNA Evidence
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